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 Inequity aversion, the negative response to receiving an unequal reward, 
has been intensely studied and is well established in humans. However, why humans 
developed a profound sense of equity is still enigmatic, and the evolutionary roots of 
this interesting phenomenon are still largely unknown. The little research that has been 
completed on nonhuman primates indicates that some species, like humans, are 
inequity averse, while others are not. Brosnan and de Waal (2003) suggested that an 
aversion to inequitable outcomes coevolved as a response to an increased emphasis 
on cooperative relationships, where individuals would respond negatively when their 
rewards differed from those of a social partner. Chen and Santos (2006), however, 
suggested that inequity aversion evolved in response to contrast effects, or individual 
expectations, in which individuals would respond negatively when their rewards differed 
from those previously received by the individual; this suggests that an animal forms 
expectations that are irrespective of rewards received by a social partner.  
This study aimed to test these two hypotheses by examining responses to 
inequitable outcomes in three yet untested primate genera (Gorilla, Nomascus, and 
Papio) and one genus which has been previously tested (Pongo). To investigate 
responses to inequitable outcomes, an established inequity paradigm was used 
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following Brosnan and de Waal (2003), in which primate subjects were required to 
complete a task before receiving a reward. Because only responses to differences in 
reward quality had been tested with nonhuman primates using this paradigm, this study 
introduced an additional test condition to determine how reward quantity differences 
would affect individual responses to unequal offerings. It was found that some olive 
baboons, western-lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons responded negatively to 
both individual expectations and social expectations. Orangutans, however, responded 
to individual expectations, but not to social expectations. This study suggests that there 
is individual variation in inequity responses of olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas, 
and white-cheeked gibbons; this is similar to the individual variation in inequity aversion 
that has been proposed for chimpanzees and bonobos. This study also suggests that 
orangutans are not inequity averse, which supports results found in previous studies of 
orangutan inequity aversion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans and nonhuman primates must continuously make decisions in order to 
navigate their social and ecological environments. In order to maximize their fitness, it is 
generally assumed that individuals would make decisions to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the costs of behaviors. However, individuals sometimes act in ways which 
appear not to maximize their individual fitness, and these behaviors could be 
interpreted as the result of irrational decision-making. For instance, it may seem 
irrational for an individual to give up an available resource, especially if resources are 
scarce, only because it is of unequal value compared to a social partner’s. This is a 
behavioral phenomenon known as inequity aversion, and it has been observed in 
humans and nonhuman primates. Due to the prevalence of inequity aversion in several 
species of the primate lineage, it is important to understand when and why an individual 
may make such an ‘irrational’ decision and why this behavior would evolve and persist 
throughout evolutionary history.  
Inequity aversion can be defined as “the aversive reaction to an unequal 
distribution of resources” (Massen et al., 2012:145) and can be distinguished as either 
disadvantageous or advantageous (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012). Disadvantageous 
inequity occurs when an individual receives a “lesser valued outcome than a social 
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partner,” indicating that individuals who exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion will 
reject a reward that is of lesser value than a social partner’s reward (Brosnan and de 
Waal, 2012:337). Advantageous inequity occurs when an individual receives “a more 
valuable outcome than a social partner,” indicating that individuals who exhibit 
advantageous inequity aversion will reject a reward that is of greater value than a social 
partner’s reward (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012:337).  
A response to advantageous inequity aversion is particularly interesting given the 
“selfish” nature of Darwinian evolution, in which the individual is the unit of selection. 
This follows from the idea that natural selection generally only promotes behaviors that 
benefit the fitness of an actor. Thus, if behaviors are selected upon because they 
increase the survival or reproductive success on an individual level, it is curious that an 
individual would give up a resource because it was greater than what a conspecific 
would receive. It is especially interesting that an individual would behave in a way that 
benefits non-kin group members at a cost to themselves.  
There are at least two scenarios that may explain why individuals express 
advantageous inequity aversion. A negative response to advantageous inequity may be 
a prosocial behavior, in which individuals help one another work toward a goal that 
cannot be achieved individually (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012). It is also possible that 
individuals who express advantageous inequity aversion may be sensitive to potential 
future retaliation (Brosnan et al., 2010). A social partner could retaliate if the individual 
accepts a better reward than what is given to their social partner. Until more is known 
about how inequity aversion may have evolved, it is difficult to determine why 
individuals would reject a greater reward than that of a social partner.  
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The aim of this study was to contribute to the understanding of when and why an 
individual may be inequity averse and how this trait may have evolved in humans. 
Extant nonhuman primate species are good models for testing hypotheses about the 
evolution of inequity aversion in humans for two main reasons. Nonhuman primates are 
the closest living relatives of humans, indicating that testing nonhuman primates can 
provide information about whether inequity aversion may have evolved from a common 
ancestor of humans and other nonhuman primate lineages. Additionally, there is 
variation in the socioecological environments of nonhuman primates that can be 
compared and contrasted to those of humans. In this way, hypotheses concerning the 
social or ecological pressures that may have led to the evolution of inequity aversion 
can be more easily tested. To better elucidate the evolutionary pressures that may have 
led to the emergence of inequity aversion, this study examined responses to unequal 
reward distributions in three yet untested primate species, olive baboons, western-
lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons, and one species that had been previously 
tested for inequity aversion, orangutans.   
 
Inequity Aversion in Humans 
 
Previous studies have indicated that both adults and children exhibit negative 
reactions to inequitable outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; McAuliffe et al., 2013), and 
that inequity aversion occurs at an early age in humans (McAuliffe et al., 2013). At 
about four years of age, children begin to respond negatively to disadvantageous 
inequity, and at roughly eight years of age, children begin to react negatively to 
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advantageous inequity (McAuliffe et al., 2013). This suggests that, in humans, 
disadvantageous inequity aversion probably develops prior to advantageous inequity 
aversion (McAuliffe et al., 2013). Disadvantageous inequity aversion also appears to be 
more common than advantageous inequity aversion, as negative responses to lesser 
rewards occur more often than negative responses to greater rewards (McAuliffe et al., 
2013).  
While the above aspects of inequity aversion are consistent among humans, 
there is also individual variation in responses to inequity among human subjects. For 
instance, some studies have shown that males and females assign rewards and 
distinguish fairness differently, indicating that responses to inequity may vary by sex 
(Pruitt, 1985). Men, for example, will often take a competitive approach to equity 
games, ensuring that final outcomes between negotiators are unequal; females, on the 
other hand, more often take a cooperative approach, allowing final outcomes between 
negotiators to remain relatively similar (Pruitt, 1985).  
Peoples’ ideas of fairness also vary depending on their goals (Skitka, 2012). For 
instance, people prefer to distribute equal allocations when given hypothetical scenarios 
that require affiliation among workers (Leung, 1986).  However, people prefer to receive 
greater rewards than their partner in situations concerned with productivity (Skitka, 
2012). When people are given a hypothetical situation in which work accentuates 
productivity, they prefer an equitable, or profit-making, outcome in which everyone gets 
rewarded based on the amount of work they put in (Leung, 1986). This could explain 
why people prefer universities where academic salary distributions are dependent on 
productivity levels (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990).   
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 Recent research with children has shown that human responses to inequity 
aversion also vary by culture. For instance, children 6 to 8 years of age living in the 
United States or South Africa preferred to discard a resource rather than give the 
resource to one individual; in this way, the children were maintaining equal rewards 
across the subject and partner instead of creating an unequal reward distribution (Shaw 
and Olson, 2012). However, children 6 to 7 years of age living in Uganda preferred to 
create unequal distributions rather than discard a resource (Paulus, 2015).  
Researchers have argued that cultures which are often exposed to environments 
lacking in resources and which emphasize individual equality to a lesser degree are 
less likely to respond negatively to reward inequality (Paulus, 2015). 
In addition to culture, other social factors, such as relationship strength, have 
been shown to influence inequity aversion. For example, humans’ decisions regarding 
the distribution of payoffs are contingent upon the strength of relationship between the 
subject and partner (Loewenstein et al., 1989).  The study by Loewenstein and 
colleagues (1989) indicated that humans respond more strongly to inequity when they 
have a strong relationship with their social partner as opposed to a relatively weaker 
relationship. People also tend to split distributions more evenly on occasions when 
partners have spent more time together (Skitka, 2012). This may indicate that the value 
of a particular relationship may be important in the maintenance of inequity aversion in 
humans. Thus, the goal of maintaining a social relationship may cause people to 
behave in what appears to be an unselfish manner. Inequity aversion, and particularly 
advantageous inequity aversion, may therefore be a behavior humans use to avoid 
relationship damage.   
6 
 
 
Inequity Aversion in Nonhuman Primates 
 
Although much research on inequity aversion has been completed with humans, 
only a small number of primate species has been tested to elucidate the evolutionary 
roots of humans’ sense of inequity. As of yet, only chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
(Brosnan et al., 2010), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2003), and macaques (Macaca mulatta and Macaca fascicularis) (Hopper et al., 2013; 
Massen et al., 2012) have been shown to be inequity averse, while orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus) (Brosnan et al., 2011), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus and Saimiri 
boliviensis) (Freeman et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2010), owl monkeys (Aotus spp.) 
(Freeman et al., 2013), marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) (Freeman et al., 2013), and 
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) (Neiworth et al., 2009) did not respond to inequitable 
outcomes. Evidence concerning inequity aversion in bonobos (Pan paniscus) is 
currently inconclusive, because some bonobos responded negatively to receiving 
unequal rewards in one study, but the results were not statistically significant (Brauer et 
al., 2009).  
  While some nonhuman primate species are inequity averse, they do not 
respond negatively to inequitable outcomes when they are given rewards in the 
absence of a task (i.e., something the primates must successfully complete in order be 
rewarded) (Brosnan et al., 2010). To elicit a response to inequity, many researchers 
have incorporated a token-exchange task into the experimental design;  this requires 
that the subject first accept and trade a harmless, inedible object before receiving a 
food reward from an experimenter (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010; 
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Brosnan et al., 2011; Chen and Santos, 2006; Freeman et al., 2013; Hopper et al., 
2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). This token-
exchange procedure usually involves at least two conditions. In the equity condition, the 
experimenter gives the subject and a social partner the same reward after both 
individuals trade a non-food token for a designated food item (Brosnan, 2013). In the 
inequity condition, the experimenter gives one individual a more preferred reward after 
the token exchange and the other individual a less preferred reward after the inedible 
token has been traded (Brosnan, 2013). In this paradigm, the experimenter observes 
the response of a subject when they receive an unequal distribution and have no 
control over their partner’s outcomes; the researcher then compares this reaction to the 
same individual’s response after receiving an equal reward as their partner (Brosnan, 
2013).   
While most researchers now agree that a task is required to elicit a negative 
response to inequity in nonhuman primates, there is still conflicting evidence about the 
effects of effort, or how much an individual is required to work in order to receive a 
reward. It is possible that nonhuman primates are more concerned with the quality or 
amount of rewards received as opposed to the amount of work the individual had to 
complete before receiving the rewards. For instance, some studies showed that 
responses to inequity were not affected by the level of effort that was required to 
complete a task (Brosnan et al., 2010; DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013).  Brosnan (2013) 
stated that a response to inequity may not be affected by effort, and therefore sensitivity 
to inequitable outcomes is due to differences in rewards earned rather than differences 
in the amount of work completed.  
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However, Brosnan and de Waal (2012) acknowledged that the combination of 
unequal effort and inequitable distribution may enhance responses, as nonhuman 
primates responded negatively to disadvantageous inequity more often when they were 
required to complete a task involving greater effort. This claim was supported in one 
study, in which capuchins were required to exchange a token either once or three times 
before receiving a less preferred food reward than their social partner; the social 
partner, in this case, always received a more preferred reward without having to 
complete a task (van Wolkenten et al., 2007).  In that study, the monkeys participated 
in the task significantly less often when they were required to exchange a token three 
times for a less preferred reward, as opposed to when they made only one exchange 
for that same reward (van Wolkenten et al., 2007). An individual’s sensitivity to effort in 
relation to rewards gained would make sense in terms of an animal’s foraging choices 
in their natural environment. An animal would need to determine whether the benefits of 
gaining access to specific food sources, such as those of preferred taste or those that 
provide a greater abundance of food, would outweigh the costs of gaining the food, 
such as predation risk, energy consumed by traveling, and competition with 
conspecifics. 
 
The Evolution of Inequity Aversion 
 
As it appears as though negative responses to unequal reward distributions are 
not unique to humans, it is important to understand how the trait may have evolved. 
However, understanding the evolution of inequity aversion is a complicated process for 
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a number of reasons. First, is often difficult to determine whether a behavioral trait, 
including inequity aversion, is a homology (a trait shared by two or more species based 
on descent that was inherited from a common ancestor) or a homoplasy (a trait shared 
by two or more species based on similar function that evolved independently in different 
lineages). This is because behavioral traits are not as apparent as morphological traits, 
for example. Additionally, when considering whether or not a species is inequity averse, 
it is important to note that the absence of a response to unequal distributions does not 
equate to the absence of an ability to recognize disparity between resource allocations. 
Observing an expected response in a species provides a clear demonstration that an 
individual is capable of recognizing and responding to inequity; however, the lack of 
performance does not necessarily indicate that they are not capable of doing so. An 
individual may recognize that their outcome is unequal to a social partner’s outcome, 
but they may still accept the unequal reward. Although behavioral traits, such as 
inequity aversion, may be difficult to interpret, it is nonetheless imperative to try to 
understand how inequity aversion evolved. 
While humans and some nonhuman primate species show negative reactions to 
inequitable outcomes, researchers have stated that inequity aversion does not appear 
to be a homology for the order Primates, as not all primate species tested thus far have 
exhibited an aversion to unequal rewards (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). However, only 
a limited number of primate species have been tested for inequity aversion, and a 
homology of the trait for the order Primates cannot be completely ruled out at this time. 
It is therefore imperative to test additional primate species for the presence or absence 
of inequity aversion. If later research supports the homology of inequity aversion in 
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Primates, further analysis would have to address the common behavioral and cognitive 
characteristics among all primate species that may have led to the evolution of a sense 
of inequity. Furthermore, research would have to be completed in order to understand 
why the behavior was secondarily lost in some primate species. Importantly, even if 
inequity aversion is not homologous in the order Primates, the trait could still be a 
homology for certain primate subgroups. 
Researchers have suggested that a common origin of inequity aversion is 
unlikely for the hominoid clade, as orangutans do not respond to inequitable outcomes 
(Brosnan et al., 2011). However, it is still difficult to make this claim, because there is 
conflicting evidence about bonobo inequity aversion (Brauer et al., 2006), and gorillas 
and hylobatids, such as gibbons, have not been tested with an established inequity 
paradigm. It is possible that bonobos, gorillas, and hylobatids respond negatively to 
unequal outcomes, which could indicate that the last common ancestor of extant 
hominoids already possessed inequity aversion, and orangutans lost it secondarily, 
perhaps due to their semi-solitary nature.  
Further assessments have been made about the evolution of inequity aversion 
among additional primate subgroups, as well. Whether inequity aversion is a homology 
in the superfamily Cercopithecoidea is currently unknown, because the only Old World 
monkey genus that has yet been tested is Macaca (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 
2012). The evolution of inequity aversion in the parvorder Platyrrhini is a little clearer, 
considering more species in this subgroup have been tested. It appears as though 
inequity aversion is not homologous in New World monkeys, because capuchin 
monkeys do respond negatively to inequity, whereas marmosets, tamarins, squirrel 
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monkeys, and owl monkeys do not (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). However, the 
apparent absence of inequity aversion in callitrichids, squirrel monkeys, and owl 
monkeys could be attributed to the limited amount of data that has been collected for 
these species. Furthermore, the absence of data on strepsirrhines and tarsiers renders 
the evolution of inequity aversion even more nebulous.  
If inequity aversion is not homologous in Primates, then this trait evolved 
independently multiple times during the evolutionary history of this group. Such 
independent evolution of inequity aversion would suggest that similar evolutionary 
pressures led to convergent solutions in distantly related species. In this context, the 
importance of testing additional primate species becomes even more apparent. 
Researchers agree that regardless of whether inequity aversion is homologous 
or homoplastic, this behavioral trait most likely evolved in different species in a series of 
stages (Chen and Santos, 2006; Brosnan, 2013). The presumption is that each stage 
promoted the reproductive success and/or the survival of individuals. After interpreting 
Brosnan’s explanation of inequity aversion, Chen and Santos (2006) suggested that the 
first stage involves the evolution of an organism’s cognitive ability to realize that the 
value of resources of others can diverge from the value of the individual’s own 
resources. The second stage is the evolution of an organism’s capability of responding 
to unequal outcomes (Chen and Santos, 2006). The third and final stage, according to 
Chen and Santos (2006), is the organism’s tendency to give up their own rewards in 
order to create a more equal reward distribution. 
However, at least one significant stage in the evolution of inequity aversion is 
omitted from this scheme. Before an organism can realize that their own rewards differ 
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from those of another individual, that organism must first distinguish the self from the 
other. For instance, Mitchell (2015) argued that an organism must recognize that their 
body and behaviors are separate from those of their conspecifics, and the organism 
must distinguish when their body movements and behaviors either resemble or differ 
from the movements and behaviors of others. Only then can the organism complete 
stages one through three as suggested by Chen and Santos (2006).  
While the ultimate causes of inequity aversion (those which explain how and why 
the trait came to be) are of greatest interest to most researchers, it is also important to 
understand the proximate causes of inequity aversion (those which explain the 
mechanisms facilitating an individual to exhibit the behavior). Therefore, the aim of this 
thesis is not to simply explain the evolution of inequity aversion at the ultimate level, but 
is rather to better understand the underlying mechanisms of inequity aversion (at the 
proximate level).  
If inequity aversion is not a homologous trait for the order Primates, then it must 
be considered as to why this trait appears in certain primate species and not others. 
Why would inequity aversion evolve separately several times in evolutionary history? 
What function does inequity aversion fulfill? If inequity aversion is a homplastic trait for 
the order Primates, this allows for the testing of hypotheses regarding the evolution of 
this trait, with each lineage or subgroup acting as a contrast for the others. If inequity 
aversion is homplastic within primate subgroups, such as at the superfamily, family, or 
genus level, hypotheses for the evolution of inequity aversion should focus on species’ 
socioecological environment.  
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Inequity, Social Organization, and Cooperation 
It is possible that inequity aversion evolved in order to maintain cooperative 
relationships among group members (Brauer et al., 2006; Brosnan, 2013; Brosnan and 
de Waal, 2012; Massen et al., 2012; Skitka, 2012; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), which 
would be plausible considering that so far only species that live in large, complex 
societies and which cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members have 
been shown to respond negatively to unequal rewards (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). 
For example, capuchin monkeys, macaques, and chimpanzees, all species which are 
inequity averse, rely on the cooperation of non-kin group members for forming coalition 
alliances in aggressive situations (Higham and Maestripieri, 2010; Nishida, 1983; Perry, 
1996; van Noordwijk and van Schaik, 1985). Chimpanzees also show cooperative 
mate-guarding (Watts, 1998), cooperative hunting (Boesch, 1994), and meat-sharing 
(Mitani and Watts, 2001) with non-kin conspecifics. Additionally, capuchin monkeys 
cooperate to gain food resources (Rose, 1997) and show food-sharing behavior (Perry 
and Rose, 1994) with non-kin individuals.  
Furthermore, it is fairly easy to see how inequity aversion may have evolved to 
increase cooperation and social interaction among group members in species where 
individuals have repeated interactions, long-term relationships, mutual benefits, and 
dependency with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members. Massen and 
colleagues (2012) suggested that individuals who cooperate with conspecifics may 
evade unequal outcomes by using complex decision-making abilities to monitor the 
outcomes of social partners. If one individual is consistently receiving fewer benefits 
than their cooperative partner, that individual may cancel their cooperative relationship 
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with that particular partner, assuming the individual recognized the disparity in their 
outcomes. This is because cooperative partners may only want to invest in cooperation 
if the rewards are equally beneficial. Thus, an awareness of equal sharing is useful for 
maintaining a high level of cooperativeness (Massen et al., 2012).  
Similarly, it has been suggested that aversive reactions to inequity may have 
evolved as a way to determine the reliability of a potential social partner (Brosnan, 
2013; Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et al., 2011), in which individuals test 
whether social partners will give as equally as they receive. For instance, an interest in 
another’s well-being could enhance an individual’s reputation of being a “fair” partner 
and may ensure later reciprocity in the individual’s favor (Brosnan, 2013). Research 
with capuchin monkeys supports this idea, as the monkeys appear to recognize and 
anticipate future necessary cooperation with their partners (Brosnan, 2013). However, 
due to the limited data regarding the relationship between inequity aversion and future 
cooperation, this theoretical explanation needs to be further explored before definitive 
conclusions can be made.  
While there is strong evidence that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with an 
increase in cooperative relationships, it is less clear why cooperative breeders such as 
marmosets (Freeman et al., 2013) and tamarins (Neiworth et al., 2009) would not be 
inequity averse. Species in which both the male and female participate in rearing 
offspring obviously must socially cooperate with one another (Brosnan, 2013). 
However, these species do not appear to be inequity averse, perhaps because 
responding to unequal outcomes is costly to those with close, exclusive social 
relationships (Brosnan, 2013; DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). This is plausible because 
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inequity aversion is assumed to be a method for determining the value of a social 
partner. However, switching partners is more costly in pair-bonded species who have 
already invested significant time and resources into their partnerships; therefore, 
responding to inequitable outcomes would be less beneficial for these individuals 
(Brosnan, 2013). It has been predicted that pair-living partners with a newly formed 
relationship are more likely to respond negatively to unequal outcomes than partners 
with a longer relationship history, because replacing a social partner is more difficult 
and costly for the latter individuals (DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). This may explain 
why pair-bonded species, such as gibbons, do sometimes switch social partners 
(Reichard, 1995).  
Inequity aversion may be a trait that is only maintained where there are direct 
fitness consequences of maintaining it. Those who are inequity averse should enjoy 
higher fitness than those who are not when an absence of the trait is consequential to 
one’s survival or opportunity to reproduce. Perhaps in species where individuals have 
the opportunity to cooperate with multiple non-kin conspecifics, an individual receives 
greater fitness benefits from choosing the conspecific that provides the most equal 
partnership. However, species which typically only cooperate with kin or few non-kin 
individuals do not benefit from reacting negatively to unequal resource distributions.  
 
Alternative Hypothesis for the Evolution of Inequity Aversion 
Although it is plausible that inequity aversion evolved as a response to 
cooperation among non-kin group members, alternative hypotheses have been 
proposed. For example, Chen and Santos (2006) criticized Brosnan’s hypothesis that 
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suggested that the underlying mechanisms of inequity are related to sociality; they 
argued that Brosan’s approach is too domain-specific, or too narrow. Chen and Santos 
(2006) instead proposed that inequity aversion occurs in contexts irrespective of a 
social domain.   
It was hypothesized that a negative response to unequal outcomes is a reply to a 
violation of previous expectations (Chen and Santos, 2006), known as “contrast effects” 
(Brosnan and de Waal, 2012), “frustration effects” (Roma et al., 2006), or the “food-
expectation hypothesis” (Brauer et al., 2006). In these models, an animal expects to 
receive a reward that they have previously been shown or have previously been given. 
When the animal does not receive that expected reward, they respond negatively. In 
compliance with the “food-expectation hypothesis” (Brauer et al., 2006), inequity 
aversion should occur if expectations are violated, regardless of the presence or 
absence of a social partner. 
Chen and Santos (2006) therefore hypothesized that inequity aversion evolved in 
response to a more general environment based on a reference-point that may or may 
not have a social component. They suggested that one apparent evolutionary 
advantage to recognizing another individual’s rewards is to determine whether others 
living in the same environment are receiving more payoffs than one’s own 
environmental rewards (Chen and Santos, 2006). Chen and Santos (2006) theorized 
that understanding the payoffs of others could indicate important changes occurring in 
the organism’s environment that may affect an individual’s behavior, especially 
regarding feeding patterns. For example, an animal who recognizes that other 
individuals receive better food from a shared environment should more actively seek 
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this food themselves, regardless of the presence or absence of cooperative partners 
(Chen and Santos, 2006). However, it could be argued that as long as an individual’s 
environmental needs are met, there is no benefit to knowing whether their group 
members are gaining more “payoffs” from their environment.  
It must be considered that the hypothesis proposed by Chen and Santos is not 
entirely plausible as currently stated, and it remains rather theoretical, as it is difficult to 
test empirically. For example, environmental resources are constantly changing in 
response to several variables, including season, temperature, rainfall patterns, and 
sometimes environmental destruction by humans. Similarly, natural resources, such as 
food items, are almost always different from one another in some way, even when food 
rewards are of the same species. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that two fruits 
even on the same tree will ever have the exact same size, shape, density, ripeness, 
and nutritional content. Similarly, the internal stage of the individual, such as hunger or 
satiation, in addition to other factors—such as dominance status, distance to food 
sources, the presence of competing conspecifics, and the presence of predators—play 
into an individual’s decision to leave a food source in search for a better resource. The 
consequence of the immense variation in ecological variables is that primates should be 
constantly changing their expectations to fit their environment. An animal can almost 
never expect to receive the same exact food item that the individual received in the 
past, and because of this, should not react negatively a priori when a current reward 
does not match those of past rewards.  
Brosnan and de Waal (2012) also countered the argument that negative 
responses to unequal rewards are due to contrast effects rather than social 
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expectations. Contradicting evidence to the claim of contrast effects has been shown 
experimentally for several species which are inequity averse (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2012). For instance, nonhuman primates refused to participate in a task with a social 
partner when the subject received a less preferred reward than their partner; however, 
in the absence of a social partner, these same animals fail to respond negatively after 
receiving a different reward than one previously shown to them (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2012). If the primates were only responding to the contrast between past and present 
rewards, these animals should have responded negatively in both scenarios. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
STUDY AIMS 
 
As the study of inequity aversion is rather recent in primatology, there is still 
much to learn about the mechanisms and function that govern this behavior. An 
obvious need is to increase the number of primate species tested for inequity aversion 
under controlled conditions. In order to better understand the evolution of inequity 
aversion, this study aimed to examine this phenomenon in three yet untested primate 
genera.  This study also included a species which has been previously tested in order 
to check for consistency in intraspecific responses to inequity and to provide validity for 
this study’s methods.  While an established inequity paradigm (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2003) was used to allow for easier comparison of behavioral responses across studies, 
a new test condition was added to provide a better understanding of species’ responses 
to unequal reward distributions.  
 
Species Selection 
 
One of the most pertinent areas of future research pertaining to the expansion of 
nonhuman primate inequity studies is to test the remaining ape species to better 
understand the behavior’s prevalence among hominoids. This includes studying 
20 
 
 
individuals of the family Hylobatidae and those of the genus Gorilla, as little is known 
about either group’s responses to inequity. Although it appears as though not all 
primates in the superfamily Hominoidea are inequity averse (Brosnan et al., 2011), 
studying hylobatids and gorillas could increase the understanding of how a species’ 
socioecological environment plays a role in inequity aversion. Similarly, if both 
hylobatids and gorillas do respond negatively to unequal outcomes, it could indicate 
that the last common ancestor of extant hominoids already possessed the capacity for 
inequity aversion, and orangutans may have lost this ability secondarily.  
As macaques are so far the only Old World monkeys that have been tested in 
regards to inequity aversion (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012), completing 
similar inequity experiments on additional Old World monkeys, such as baboons of the 
genus Papio, is of paramount importance for understanding the evolutionary roots of 
inequity aversion. Studies of baboons can help to determine possible sociecological 
factors driving inequity responses in humans and nonhuman animals. Studying 
baboons also puts us one step closer to understanding whether or not there could be 
homology of inequity aversion in Cercopithecoidea.  
While orangutans have been tested for inequity aversion in one study, it is 
important to include this species in additional studies on this topic for a number of 
reasons. As of yet, orangutans are the only ape species that has been definitively 
declared as non-aversive to unequal distributions. It is therefore important to determine 
whether the absence of inequity aversion in the small number of orangutans tested 
(N=5; Brosnan et al., 2011) is anomalous or whether the absence of the behavior is 
characteristic of the species as a whole. Additionally, including a species already tested 
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for inequity aversion provides a source of validation for the research methods, as 
observed behaviors of this species can be compared across studies.  
Orangutans, hylobaitds, gorillas, and baboons are good model species for the 
study of inequity aversion not only due to these groups’ phylogenetic relationship with 
previously tested species, but also due to the socioecological differences among them.  
Researchers agree that it is necessary to increase our knowledge about the similarities 
and differences of inequity responses in socially cooperative species as opposed to 
those which do not typically cooperate with non-kin group members (Brosnan and de 
Waal, 2012). Testing species which vary in the amount of cooperation that occurs 
among conspecifics would be beneficial for understanding the social implications of 
inequity aversion. 
Orangutans, gibbons, gorillas, and baboons are excellent model species to 
determine the relationship between species cooperation and inequity aversion. 
Orangutans are considered solitary foragers which have only brief social interactions 
with non-kin conspecifics (Mitani et al., 1991; te Boekhorst et al., 1990). Hylobatids 
typically live in bonded pairs with dependent offspring (Reichard and Boesch, 2003; 
Palombit 1996). Gorillas often live in family groups averaging nine individuals 
(Yamagiwa et al., 2003), consisting of all adult males or one or two males and multiple 
females (Doran and McNeilage, 1998). Baboons of the genus Papio are characterized 
by high sociality as expressed in their multi-male, multi-female social organization, 
averaging between 15 and 150 individuals (Barton et al, 1996; Dunbar and Dunbar, 
1974; Ray and Sapolsky, 1992; Rowel, 1966), Due to the varied social interactions 
these four primate groups have with non-kin group members, testing orangutans, 
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hylobatids, gorillas, and baboons would make an excellent comparison for 
understanding the social influences driving inequity aversion.  
 
Adding to the Current Procedural Paradigm 
 
In order to allow for cross-species comparison of nonhuman primates, it is 
important to use similar procedures with each species tested (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2012). As the majority of studies investigating inequity aversion involve a token-
exchange or targeting paradigm (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan 
and de Waal, 2005; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; van 
Wolkenten et al., 2007), it would beneficial to mimic these methods when examining 
inequity in a species that has yet to be tested. To control for contrast effects, a contrast 
condition should be used in which the subject and partner complete a task and are both 
given a less-preferred reward than the one previously shown to them, as prior studies 
have done (Brosnan, 2013).  
While it is important to use procedures similar to those used in previous inequity 
aversion studies in order to allow for cross-species comparison, it is equally necessary 
to explore how responses to inequity vary with differences in methodology (Brosnan 
and de Waal, 2012). Therefore, it would be beneficial for researchers to use an 
established inequity paradigm involving a task (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), while 
adding one procedure not yet tested in nonhuman primates. As it appears as though 
differences in quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, reward distributions have not been 
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analyzed in relation to nonhuman primate inequity aversion, this would be a valuable 
addition to future experimental procedures.  
While many species clearly demonstrate their aversion to unequal qualitative 
distributions (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; 
Chen and Santos, 2006; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 
2012; Roma et al., 2006; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), it would be 
interesting to see whether individuals respond negatively to receiving a lesser amount 
of the same food rewards than a social partner. It is obvious that recognizing the type of 
food obtained by oneself and one’s conspecific is important in an animal’s natural 
environment, as different foods cause animals to be more satiated than others. 
However, recognizing the abundance or scarcity of food gained by social partners 
compared to themselves seems equally, if not more, important for an animal’s survival. 
If it is assumed that inequity aversion evolved in response to a species’ ecological 
environment, it is essential to assess whether negative responses to unequal 
quantitative distributions exist in primate species. 
Although adding a difference in quantitative distributions to the procedure is 
clearly important for the study of inequity aversion, there are several aspects one must 
consider before doing so. For instance, some rewards may be interpreted as so high in 
value that receiving a smaller amount of a high-value reward than a conspecific partner 
may not elicit a negative response. Therefore, distributing different amounts of the low-
value reward would be a better indicator of the role quantity plays in response to 
unequal outcomes. 
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 Another important consideration to make before introducing a quantitative 
component into the current inequity paradigm is whether or not nonhuman primates are 
able to recognize numerical differences in resources. Researchers have found that 
several nonhuman primate species are able to distinguish between two sets of items 
that differ numerically, including chimpanzees (Beran, 2001; Beran et al., 2008; Boysen 
and Berntson, 1995; Hanus and Call, 2007), bonobos (Hanus and Call, 2007), rhesus 
macaques (Beran, 2007; Brannon and Terrace), hamadryas baboons (Smith et al., 
2003), and squirrel monkeys (Smith et al., 2003). Research has also suggested that 
nonhuman primates understand numerosity used in naturalistic contexts, such as vocal 
communication (Kitchen, 2004) and intergroup conflict (Wilson et al., 2001).  
 Importantly, all nonhuman primate groups tested in this study have been shown 
to have numerical abilities. For instance, in one study, gorillas and orangutans were 
able to select the larger of two amounts of the same food item when the quantities were 
presented at the same time and when the quantities were presented one after the other 
(Hanus and Call, 2007).  Similarly, gibbons were able to select the larger of two 
quantities at a greater percentage than expected by chance when the ratio between 
quantities was 4/3, 3/2, 5/3, or 5/2 (Yocum, 2010). In another study, olive baboons were 
able to distinguish between two small amounts of food (both less than four items), two 
large amounts of food (both greater than four items), and between one small amount 
and one large amount of food (Barnard et al., 2013).  
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Hypotheses and Predictions 
 
The current consensus among most scholars researching inequity aversion is 
that a negative response to inequitable outcomes evolved in tandem with an increase in 
cooperative relationships among conspecifics (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et 
al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Freeman et al., 2013; 
Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 
2007). Therefore, hypotheses can be made about the presence or absence of inequity 
aversion in those primate species that have yet to be studied. It was hypothesized that 
“social” species would show aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable 
outcomes, whereas “semi-social” species would not. “Social” species were defined here 
as those which cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members and have 
an average group size consisting of greater than four individuals. “Semi-social” species 
were considered to be those which do not cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded 
conspecifics and have average group sizes including four or fewer individuals. 
Additionally, predictions can be made about nonhuman primate responses to 
advantageous inequity aversion. Studies of human inequity aversion have shown that  
humans respond more strongly to inequity when they have a strong relationship with 
their social partner (Loewenstein et al., 1989) and when partners have spent more time 
together (Skitka, 2012). Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with a strong 
relationship with their social partner, who were members of species which cooperate 
with non-kin group members, would show aversive reactions to advantageous 
inequitable outcomes.  
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Lastly, it was predicted that none of the nonhuman primate species tested would 
exhibit contrast effects. This is because environmental resources and an animal’s 
internal state are constantly changing in response to several variables, and food items 
in a natural environment are almost always different from one another in some way, 
even when food rewards are of the same species. In the wild, an animal can almost 
never expect to receive the same exact food item that the individual received in the 
past, and because of this, should not react negatively a priori when a current reward 
does not match those of past rewards. Additionally, captive nonhuman primates often 
receive food items that differ from those once shown or given to them, and should 
therefore not react negatively to receiving a reward different from one previously given 
to them.  
The following predictions can then be made following the hypotheses discussed 
above: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Primate species which typically cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-
bonded group members will show aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable 
outcomes, whereas primate species which do not cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-
bonded conspecifics will not. 
Predictions: 
1a) Orangutans will not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than 
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.  
1b) Hylobatids will not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than 
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task. 
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1c) Gorillas will respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their 
social partner after both individuals complete the same task. 
1d) Baboons will respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their 
social partner after both individuals complete the same task. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals which have a strong relationship with their social partner and 
are members of species which cooperates with non-kin group members will show 
aversive reactions to advantageous inequitable outcomes; those individuals which do 
not have a strong relationship with their social partner and/or are not members of a 
species which cooperates with non-kin group members will not. 
Predictions: 
2a) Orangutans will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than 
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.  
2b) Hylobatids will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than 
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task. 
2c) Gorillas will respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than their 
social partner after both individuals complete the same task. (This prediction 
is based on the fact that the pair of gorillas tested are full-siblings, have lived 
together for 13 years, and presumably, have a strong social relationship.) 
2d) Baboons will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than 
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task. (This 
prediction is based on the fact that none of the baboons tested had prior 
contact with the individual they were paired with until the onset of this study; 
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therefore, the baboon subjects did not presumably have strong social 
relationships with their partners.) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Nonhuman primates which often receive rewards that differ from previous 
rewards given to them will not exhibit contrast effects. 
Predictions: 
3a) Orangutans will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than 
one that was previously shown to them.   
3b)  Hylobatids will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than 
one that was previously shown to them.   
3c)  Gorillas will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than one 
that was previously shown to them.   
3d)  Baboons will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than one 
that was previously shown to them.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects and Study Locations 
 
Subjects included twelve olive baboons (Papio anubis), two western-lowland 
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), four orangutans (Pongo spp.), and two white-cheeked gibbons 
(Nomascus leucogenys). All nonhuman primate subjects were novel to inequity testing. 
No subject was deprived of food or water, which was available ad libitum to all subjects 
during experimentation. Additionally, subjects were given two more extensive meals per 
day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. With the exception of small food 
rewards given during experimentation, no changes to the subjects’ regular feeding 
schedules or diet were made prior to, during, or after testing. This study was approved 
by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of Southern Illinois University 
Carbondale (IACUC 15-008), the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of 
Texas Biomedical Research Institute (IACUC 1495 PC 0), and the Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee of Smithsonian National Zoological Park (NZP-IACUC 15-17).  
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Baboons 
During the study, all twelve olive baboon subjects were temporarily individually 
housed in the veterinary clinic at the Southwest National Primate Research Center 
(SNPRC) in San Antonio, Texas. Baboons were housed in hanging cages, 
approximately 1 x 1.2 m in size, with the exception of one male subject housed in a 
cage stationed on the ground that was approximately 1.5 x 1.8 m in size (Table 2). At 
the initiation of the study, ten of the baboon subjects had been located in the veterinary 
clinic for 3 to 31 days due to minor illness and/or injury (Table 2). The remaining two 
baboons had been located in the clinic for 78 and 85 days respectively, and these two 
individuals formed a pair. Importantly, while the amount of time located in the clinic 
varied by individual, baboons were only placed next to their partners at the initiation of 
the study, and therefore, pairs were exposed to each other for the same amount of 
time. Prior to and following clinic visits, baboon subjects were housed in social groups 
comprised of between 4 and 14 individuals (Table 1).  
To ensure that baboons’ familiarity with their social partner did not affect the 
baboon’s performance, these subjects were tested in pairs consisting of two individuals 
from different social groups. All pairs remained consistent throughout all trials and test 
sessions. Male subjects were each tested with another male subject, and female 
subjects were each tested with another female subject. This was because male 
subjects were located in one room containing only male baboons, and female subjects 
were located in a separate room containing only female baboons. This procedure also 
mimicked additional studies of nonhuman primate inequity aversion, in which male 
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subjects were tested only with other males, and female subjects were tested only with 
other females (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010). 
During training and test sessions, baboon pairs were located in separate, 
adjacent cages placed approximately 15 cm apart. Cage sides were comprised of 
vertical bars spaced approximately 7 cm apart, indicating that the baboons in each pair 
were visible to one another at all times. Because the baboons have been reported by 
the facility as being both familiar and comfortable with the isolation cages, especially 
when receiving food rewards, this set-up was not expected to significantly influence the 
subjects’ behavior.  
 
Apes 
Two western-lowland gorillas, four orangutans, and two white-cheeked gibbons 
were housed in social groups at the Smithsonian National Zoological Park (NZP) in 
Washington, D.C. One gorilla social group was tested, which consisted of two full-
sibling black-back males. Two orangutan social groups were tested, which each 
included one mating pair of orangutans. One gibbon social group was tested, which 
consisted of one mating pair of gibbons.  
Because gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon subjects were limited, individuals of 
these species were tested in pairs consisting of two individuals from the same social 
group. All pairs remained consistent throughout all trials and test sessions. Gorillas, 
orangutans, and gibbons were temporarily separated from their partner into adjacent 
cages prior to each training and test session. Mesh doors separated the adjacent 
enclosures, and therefore, subjects were visible to one another for the duration of 
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experimentation. Following each session, the subjects were reintroduced to their group 
mate. Separating subjects from their social partners allowed for more control over the 
experimental conditions and prevented aggressive interactions between group mates 
during testing. Importantly, gorilla and orangutan subjects separate daily into individual 
cages for their afternoon meals, so separating from their social partners was not 
unusual. Additionally, the gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon subjects all separated from one 
another willingly and showed no signs of stress due to separation. Therefore, this set-
up was not expected to significantly influence the subjects’ behavior. 
 
Food Preference Tests 
 
 Prior to inequity testing, food preference tests were completed in order to 
determine which food items each primate pair considered to be high and low-value 
rewards. A dichotomous choice test (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004a, b) was used in 
which an assortment of foods was sequentially offered to the subjects, two food items 
at a time. All food items were preapproved by the facilities’ administrations and were 
foods that the subjects were familiar with prior to this study.  
 
Baboons 
 For food preference tests with baboons, the experimenter began by holding a 
piece of carrot (approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm) in one hand and piece of grape 
(approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm) in the other hand, keeping their hands 
centered on the primate subject and approximately 30 cm apart. The experimenter then 
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stepped forward approximately 30 cm from the first subject’s cage. The baboon subject 
was required to gesture with their hand, foot, or head toward one of the two food items, 
at which point the experimenter handed the baboon the food item that was gestured 
toward by the subject (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004). The experimenter marked which 
food item the subject gestured toward and then repeated this process with the second 
subject. To control for side biases, the experimenter alternated food items between 
their left and right hands between trials (Brosnan et al., 2010).  
This food preference test was completed a total of 5 times, followed by 5 trials of 
carrot vs. mini marshmallow and 5 trials of grape vs. mini marshmallow (15 trials per 
subject). The food item that was chosen the most by the pair of baboons was marked 
as the high-value food; the food that was chosen the least was considered the low-
value food. Each baboon pair had to prefer the high-value food item over the low-value 
food item in at least 80% of the trials in order to move on with experimentation (Brosnan 
et al., 2010).   
The experimenter then offered each baboon subject 5 successive pieces of the 
low-value food to ensure that the subjects were willing to eat several consecutive pieces 
of this food item. This was important, because each subject would be required to eat 
several successive pieces of this food item during inequity testing. This step ensured 
that any negative reaction by a baboon subject after receiving the low-value food 
reward during inequity tests would be due to an aversion to the reward distribution and 
not to the dislike of the food item itself.  
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Apes 
Food preference tests with gorillas, orangutans, and gibbons were similar to 
those completed with baboons, with the exception of a few procedural changes. To 
ensure that the ape subjects’ preferences would not change, the food preference tests 
were completed over a two-day period. In initial food preference tests, subjects 
appeared to maintain side biases, even after implementing the changing of foods from 
one hand to the other between trials. Therefore, to further avoid side biases, a 
computerized randomizer was used to determine in which hand the experimenter would 
hold each food item during each trial (as opposed to a continuous right-then-left 
pattern).  
When testing apes, the experimenter began by holding the two food items 
approximately 2.5 cm apart for about 1 s and then would separate the two items to 
approximately 30 cm apart. Each ape subject was exposed to 10 trials of each food 
preference test (30 trials per day and 60 trials total). All gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon 
subjects were also required to eat 15 consecutive pieces of the low-value food item, as 
each subject would be required to eat this amount during inequity testing. 
Food items offered to ape subjects during food preference tests varied by 
species according to previous food preferences documented by the apes’ caregivers. 
Gorillas completed food preference trials with apple vs. carrot, apple vs. grape, and 
carrot vs. grape. Orangutans were offered apple vs. orange, apple vs. grape, and 
orange vs. grape during food preference tests. Gibbons completed food preference 
tests with apple vs. melon, apple vs. grape, and melon vs. grape. All food items for 
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gorillas and orangutans were approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm in size. All food 
items for gibbons were approximately 6 mm x 6 mm x 3 mm in size. 
 
Training 
 
 Prior to inequity testing, all nonhuman primate subjects were trained to complete 
a task. Following task completion during training sessions, the experimenter rewarded 
baboon subjects with a 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm piece of apple, gorilla subjects with a 
2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm piece of banana, orangutan subjects with a 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 
3 mm piece of papaya, and gibbon subjects with a 6 mm x 6 mm x 3 mm piece of 
banana. These food items were used only during training sessions for each species to 
ensure that the subjects did not become biased toward the food item used for training 
(Brosnan et al., 2010). To avoid side biases, the experimenter alternated between trials 
which hand held the target or token and which hand held the food reward (Brosnan et 
al., 2010).  
 
Baboons and Gibbons 
Baboons and gibbons were trained to accomplish a targeting task which required 
each subject to hold a designated target for 1 s and then release the target (Freeman et 
al., 2013). The target used for baboons was a piece of curved PVC pipe (approximately 
7.5 cm long and 3.5 cm wide) with a circular chain running through the opening of the 
pipe which attached to a clip at the opposite end. This item was approved and provided 
by SNPRC. The target used for gibbon subjects was a small piece of bamboo 
36 
 
 
(approximately 7.5 cm long and 6 mm wide), which was approved and provided by 
NZP.  
 For baboons, the experimenter stepped up to the subject’s cage with the target 
in one hand and the piece of banana visible to the subject in the other hand. The 
experimenter then clipped the target onto the middle of the cage at the subject’s eye 
level, and then stepped back. The baboon was given 30 s to approach and hold the 
target with their hand or foot for 1 s. When the subject removed their hand or foot from 
the target, the experimenter handed the baboon a piece of apple. The experimenter 
then moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The 
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 10 trials with each 
subject. Each baboon subject was required to complete 8 of 10 targeting tasks before 
moving on to testing sessions.  
For gibbons, the experimenter stepped up to the subject’s enclosure, held one 
end of the bamboo in one hand and the piece of banana visible to the subject in the 
other hand. The experimenter then placed the opposite end of the bamboo into the 
enclosure mesh at the subject’s waist level (or what would be waist level if the subject 
was not sitting at the start of the trial). The gibbon was given 30 s to approach and hold 
the target with their hand or foot for 1 s. When the subject removed their hand or foot 
from the target, the experimenter handed them a piece of banana. The experimenter 
then moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The 
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 15 trials with each 
subject. Each gibbon subject was required to complete 12 of 15 targeting tasks before 
moving on to testing sessions. 
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Gorillas and Orangutans 
 Gorilla and orangutan subjects completed a token-exchange task during training 
sessions, which required each subject to trade a piece of bamboo (approximately 15 cm 
long and 3.5 cm wide) with an experimenter. The bamboo tokens were approved and 
provided by NZP. For the token-exchange task, the experimenter stepped up to the 
subject’s enclosure holding one end of the bamboo in one hand and a piece of banana 
(for gorillas) or papaya (for orangutans) visible to the subject in the other hand. The 
experimenter then placed the opposite end of the bamboo into the enclosure at the 
subject’s waist level (or what would be waist level if the subject was not sitting at the 
start of the trial). Each subject was given 30 s to take the piece of bamboo from the 
experimenter, hold onto it for 1 s, and then give it back to the experimenter through the 
enclosure mesh. When the subject completed this task, the experimenter handed the 
ape a piece of banana (for gorillas) or papaya (for orangutans). The experimenter then 
moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The 
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 15 trials with each 
subject. Each gorilla and orangutan subject was required to complete 12 of 15 token-
exchange tasks before moving on to testing sessions. 
 
Testing 
 
 Each primate participated in a series of five tests (described below), completing 
30 trials (20 trials for baboons) as the role of the subject (Session 1) and 30 trials (20 
trials for baboons) as the role of the partner (Session 2) for each test. The subject and 
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partner were visible to one another through either cage bars (baboons) or enclosure 
mesh (apes) during all testing sessions, indicating that each subject had the opportunity 
to see which food reward their partner received. During each test, high and low-value 
rewards were visible through clear containers to both the subject and partner at all 
times (Brosnan et al., 2011).  
During each trial, the partner completed the task in exchange for a food reward 
prior to the subject; whether each primate began as the subject or partner was 
randomized (Brosnan et al., 2010). The first exchange between the partner and the 
experimenter constituted the first trial of the session. The first exchange between the 
subject and the experimenter represented the second trial of the session. This indicates 
that each individual completed 15 tasks (10 tasks for baboons) per session. For each 
trial, each primate had 30 seconds to complete the task. If the task was completed 
within the 30 seconds, the experimenter handed the primate a food reward. If the task 
was not completed within 30 seconds, the experimenter did not give that primate a food 
reward and instead moved on to the second individual in the pair. For each pair of 
primates, all tests described below occurred on separate days, meaning that no 
individual completed more than one test per day.  
Following each trial, each primate’s reaction after completing a task for a food 
reward was marked as either negative or positive. If the primate stopped participating in 
the task, did not take the reward from the experimenter, or took the reward but did not 
eat it, the experimenter considered the reaction to be a reward rejection, or a negative 
response (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; 
Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van 
39 
 
 
Wolkenten et al., 2007). If the primate continued to participate in task completion and 
ate the food reward, the reaction was marked as positive for that trial (Brosnan et al., 
2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper 
et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). 
Following each trial, the experimenter recorded on data sheets whether the responses 
of the subjects and partners were negative or positive.   
The experimenter also recorded ad libitum instances of abnormal and aggressive 
behavior observed for the subject and partner. Abnormal behaviors included pacing, in 
which an individual moves back and forth in the enclosure for at least two cycles, self-
biting, in which an individual bites a part of their own body (Lutz et al., 2003), and cage-
licking, in which an individual licks the sides, ceiling, or floor of the enclosure. 
Aggressive behaviors included yawning, in which an individual opens their mouth to 
display their teeth (Maestripieri et al., 1992) and cage-banging, in which an individual 
uses a body part (usually their hands, feet, or head) to apply excessive force to the 
walls, ceiling, or floor of the enclosure. After all behaviors were recorded for the trial, the 
next trial immediately followed.  
 
Test 1: Testing for Contrast Effects 
To test for contrast effects, or individual expectations (Chen and Santos, 2006), 
each pair of primates completed two sessions consisting of 30 trials each (20 trials 
each for baboons). For the first session, both the subject and partner were shown a 
high-value reward prior to task completion but were given a low-value reward following 
task completion. For the second session, both the subject and partner were shown a 
40 
 
 
large-quantity reward (three pieces of low-value food) prior to task completion but were 
given a small-quantity reward (one piece of low-value food) following task completion.   
 
Test 2: Equitable Reward Quality 
Prior to inequitable quality testing, each pair of primates completed two control 
sessions, in which both the subject and partner received the same reward. In the first 
control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in which the subject 
and partner alternated completing a task for a low-value food reward (named the low-
value control). In the second control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were 
completed in which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a high-
value food reward (named the high-value control). Because the reward quality was 
increasing across control sessions, individual expectations were not expected to affect 
the results.  
 
Test 3: Inequitable Reward Quality 
In the inequity-quality test, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in 
which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a food reward. However, 
the partner always received the high-value food reward after task completion, and the 
subject always received the low-value food reward after task completion. To test for 
disadvantageous inequity aversion, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared 
to their responses in the low-value control; to test for advantageous inequity aversion, 
the partner’s responses to this test were compared to their responses in the high-value 
control (Brosnan et al., 2010). 
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Test 4: Equitable Reward Quantity 
Prior to inequitable quantity testing, each pair of primates completed two control 
sessions, in which both the subject and partner received the same amount of rewards. 
In the first control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in which the 
subject and partner alternated completing a task for one low-value food reward (named 
the small-quantity control). In the second control session, 30 trials (20 trials for 
baboons) were completed in which the subject and partner alternated completing a task 
for three low-value food rewards (named the large-quantity control). Because, the 
reward quantity was increasing across control sessions, individual expectations should 
not have affected the results. 
 
Test 5: Inequitable Reward Quantity 
In the inequity-quantity test, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in 
which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a food reward. However, 
the partner always received the large-quantity food reward (three pieces of low-value 
food) after task completion, and the subject always received the small-quantity food 
reward (one piece of low-value food) after task completion. To test for disadvantageous 
inequity aversion, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared to their responses 
in the small-quantity control. To test for advantageous inequity aversion, the partner’s 
responses to this test were compared to their responses in the large-quantity control. 
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Interobserver Reliability 
 
Interobserver reliability scores were calculated to ensure that observations and 
scoring of animals’ behaviors were without bias. 20% of live-time sessions at SNPRC 
were scored by a second experimenter not involved in the study. All sessions 
completed at NZP were video-recorded using a Canon EOS Rebel T5 camera, and 
20% of experiments were scored from video footage by a person not involved in the 
study. Each of the these people was given identical copies of the primary 
experimenter’s data sheets and was asked to score whether each subject did or did not 
complete the task and whether each subject did or did not accept the food reward. 
Following this procedure, the score consistencies between the experimenter and the 
second scorers were compared. The interobserver reliability score for sessions 
observed at SNPRC was 1.00, indicating that 100% of baboon observations were 
consistent between the experimenter and the second scorer. The interobserver 
reliability score for sessions observed at NZP was .998, indicating that 99.8% of ape 
observations were consistent between the experimenter and the second scorer.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
 Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests for related samples were used to compare test 
conditions to control conditions (Brosnan et al., 2010). To test for quality contrast 
effects, the subjects’ responses to the quality contrast condition were compared to their 
responses in the low-value control. The subjects’ responses to the disadvantageous 
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inequitable quality condition were also compared to their responses in the low-value 
control in order to test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by 
quality. To test for advantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality, the 
subjects’ responses to the advantageous inequitable quality condition were compared 
to their responses in the high-value control. To test for quantity contrast effects, the 
subjects’ responses to the quantity contrast condition were compared to their responses 
in the small-quantity control. The subjects’ responses to the disadvantageous 
inequitable quantity condition were also compared to their responses in the small-
quantity control in order to test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when rewards 
varied by quantity. To test for advantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by 
quantity, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared to their responses in the 
large-quantity control. 
In order to determine whether there was variation in responses across conditions 
for each species, Friedman’s tests were conducted (Brosnan et al., 2010). Friedman’s 
test was used once for each species to determine whether there was variation across 
quality conditions. Friedman’s tests were also conducted for each species to determine 
whether responses varied across quantity conditions. Friedman’s tests were then 
conducted a third time for each species to assess variation across all ten conditions 
(including both quality and quantity conditions).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
Intraspecific Comparisons 
 
 
 
Food Preference Tests and Training 
Food preference tests showed that baboon subjects chose a mini marshmallow 
(high-value reward) over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 60 out of 60 overall 
trials (100% of the time). Gorilla subjects preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward) 
over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 68 out of 80 overall trials (85% of the time). 
Gibbon subjects preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward) over a piece of 
cantaloupe (low-value reward) in 64 out of 80 overall trials (80% of the time). One pair 
of orangutan subjects (Kyle and Bonnie) preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward) 
over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 75 out of 80 overall trials (94% of the time). 
The other pair of orangutan subjects (Kiko and Iris) preferred a piece of grape (high-
value reward) over a piece of orange (low-value reward) in 65 out of 80 overall trials 
(81% of the time). Given that each pair was required to choose the high-value food item 
over the low-value food item in at least 80% of trials, each pair of subjects moved on to 
training.   
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During training sessions, each of the twelve baboon subjects, each of the two 
gorilla subjects, each of the two gibbon subjects, and each of the four orangutan 
subjects completed the designated task in exchange for a food reward in at least 80% 
of trials (the criteria for beginning experimentation). Therefore, all baboon, gorilla, 
gibbon, and orangutan subjects moved on to testing sessions.  
 
Notes on Testing Orangutans 
One pair of orangutans (Bonnie and Kyle) stopped willingly separating into 
adjacent enclosures after the second day of testing, and therefore did not complete 
either of the quality control conditions, either of the inequitable quality conditions, or 
either of the inequitable quantity conditions. Therefore, this pair of individuals was only 
included in analyses regarding quantity contrast effects.  
 
Testing for Quality Contrast Effects 
To test for quality contrast effects, subjects’ refusal rates during the quality 
contrast condition (in which the subject was shown a high-value reward prior to task 
completion but was given a low-value reward following task completion) were compared 
to the same individuals’ refusal rates in the low-value control (in which the subject was 
shown a low-value reward prior to task completion and was given that same low-value 
reward following task completion) (Table IV). Results showed that five of the twelve 
baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast 
condition than during the low-value control (Figure I; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between baboons’ 
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refusal rates during the low-value control and the refusal rates during the quality 
contrast condition (Z = -1.134, p = .257) (Table V). Both of the two gorilla subjects 
responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the 
low-value control (Figure I; Table VI); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed 
that there was no statistical difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two 
conditions (Z = -1.414, p = .157) (Table VI). Neither of the two gibbon subjects 
responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the 
low-value control (Figure I; Table VII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there 
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z = 
-1.000, p = .317) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with 
higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the low-value 
control (Figure I; Table VIII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no 
statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z = 
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).  
 
Testing for Quantity Contrast Effects 
To test for quantity contrast effects, subjects’ refusal rates during the quantity 
contrast condition (in which the subject was shown three pieces of low-value food prior 
to task completion but was given only one piece of low-value food following task 
completion) were compared to the same individuals’ refusal rates during the small-
quantity control (in which the subject was shown only one piece of low-value food prior 
to task completion and was given that same piece of low-value food following task 
completion) (Table IV). Results showed that six of the twelve baboon subjects 
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responded with higher refusal rates during the quantity contrast condition than during 
the small-quantity control (Figure II; Table V). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that 
there was a statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the small-
quantity control and the refusal rates during the quantity contrast condition (Z = -2.449, 
p = .014) (Table V). Both of the gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates 
during the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II; 
Table VI); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical 
difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = -1.414, p = 
.157) (Table VI). One of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates 
during the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II; 
Table VII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference 
between gibbons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity control and the refusal rates 
during the quantity contrast condition (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Two of the four 
orangutan subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the quantity contrast 
condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II; Table VIII); however, a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between 
orangutans’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z = -1.414, p = .157) (Table VIII). 
 
Disadvantageous Inequitable Reward Quality 
To test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when the reward qualities differed, 
subjects’ refusal rates from the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (in which 
the subject was given a low-value reward after task completion and the partner was 
given a high-value reward after task completion) were compared to the same 
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individuals’ refusal rates during the low-value control (in which both the subject and 
partner were each given a low-value reward following task completion) (Table IV). Five 
of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the 
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value control (Figure 
III; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed no statistical difference 
between baboons’ refusal rates during the low-value control and the refusal rates during 
the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = -1.134, p = .257) (Table V). One 
of the two gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the 
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value control (Figure 
III; Table VI), although a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical 
difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = -1.000, p = 
.317) (Table VI). One of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates 
during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value 
control (Figure III; Table VII); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there 
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the low-value control 
and the refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = 
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with 
higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than 
during the low-value control (Figure III; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during 
these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII). 
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Disadvantageous Inequitable Reward Quantity 
To test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when reward quantities differed, 
subjects’ refusal rates from the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition (in which 
the subject was given one piece of low-value food after task completion and the partner 
was given three pieces of low-value food after task completion)  were compared to the 
same individuals’ refusal rates from the small-quantity control (in which both the subject 
and partner were each given one piece of low-value food following task completion) 
(Table IV). Four of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates 
during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the small-quantity 
control (Figure IV; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there 
was no statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity 
control and the same individual’s refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable 
quantity condition (Z = -.816, p = .414) (Table V). Only one of the two gorilla subjects 
responded with higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity 
condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure IV; Table VI); however, a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between 
gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VI). Only 
one of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the 
disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the small-quantity control 
(Figure IV; Table VII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no 
statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity control 
and the refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition (Z = 
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with 
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higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than 
during the small-quantity control (Figure IV; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during 
these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII). 
 
Advantageous Inequitable Reward Quality 
To test for advantageous inequity aversion when reward qualities differed, 
subjects’ refusal rates from the advantageous inequitable quality condition (in which the 
subject was given a high-value reward after task completion and the partner was given 
a low-value reward after task completion) were compared to the same individuals’ 
refusal rates from the high-value control (in which both the subject and partner were 
each given a high-value reward following task completion) (Table IV). Three of the 
twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous 
inequitable quality condition than during the high-value control (Figure V; Table V). A 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between 
baboons’ refusal rates during the high-value control and the same individual’s refusal 
rates during the advantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = -1.732, p = .083) 
(Table V). Neither of the two gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during 
the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during the high-value control 
(Figure V; Table VI), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no 
statistical difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = 
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VI). Neither of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher 
refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during the high-
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value control (Figure V; Table VII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there 
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during these two conditions 
(Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Similarly, neither of the two orangutan subjects 
responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quality 
condition than during the high-value control (Figure V; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ 
refusal rates during the high-value control and the refusal rates during the 
advantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII). 
 
Advantageous Inequitable Reward Quantity 
To test for advantageous inequity aversion when reward quantities differed, 
subjects’ refusal rates from the advantageous inequitable quantity condition (in which 
the subject was given three pieces of low-value food after task completion and the 
partner was given one piece of low-value food after task completion) were compared to 
the same individuals’ refusal rates from the large-quantity control (in which both the 
subject and partner were each given three pieces of low-value food following task 
completion) (Table IV). One of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher 
refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the 
large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table V). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that 
there was no statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the large-
quantity control and the same individual’s refusal rates during the advantageous 
inequitable quantity condition (Z = -1.000, p = .317) (Table V). Only one of the two 
gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous 
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inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table 
VI), a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference 
between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table 
VI). Only one of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the 
advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control 
(Figure VI; Table VII); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no 
statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the large-quantity control 
and the refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition (Z = -
1.000, p = .317) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with 
higher refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during 
the large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during 
the two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII). 
 
Overall Results 
To determine whether subjects’ refusal rates varied across conditions for each 
species, Friedman’s tests were conducted. Friedman’s tests indicated that baboon 
subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary across the five different conditions 
related to reward quality (Χ
2
 = 7.447, p = .114) (Table IX). Friedman’s tests indicated 
that baboon subjects’ refusal rates did significantly vary across the five different 
conditions related to reward quantity (Χ
2
 = 13.491, p = .009) (Table IX), and the ten total 
conditions overall (Χ
2
 = 20.810, p = .014) (Table IX). However the statistically significant 
results found for baboons in the quantity contrast effects condition (Table V) may have 
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caused the statistically significant variation across the five different conditions related to 
reward quantity and the ten total conditions overall. Friedman’s tests indicated that 
gorilla subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary across the five different 
conditions related to reward quality (Χ
2
 = 6.400, p = .171) (Table IX), across the five 
different conditions related to reward quantity (Χ
2
 = 4.000, p = .406) (Table IX), or 
across the ten total conditions overall (Χ
2
 = 11.824, p = .223) (Table IX). Similarly, 
Friedman’s tests indicated that gibbon subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary 
across the five different conditions related to reward quality (Χ
2
 = 4.000, p = .406) 
(Table IX), across the five different conditions related to reward quantity (Χ
2
 = 1.857, p 
= .762) (Table IX), or across the ten total conditions overall (Χ
2
 = 6.581, p = .681) 
(Table IX).  
Because only two orangutan subjects completed all of the ten conditions, only 
these two subjects were considered for analyses regarding variation across conditions. 
These two orangutan subjects showed 0% refusal rates for each of the ten conditions 
(Figures I-VI); therefore, no Friedman’s tests were needed to indicate variation across 
conditions. It is clear to see that orangutan subjects’ refusal rates did not vary across 
the five different conditions related to reward quality, across the five different conditions 
related to reward quantity, or across the ten total conditions overall. 
 
Interspecific Comparisons 
 
Because most of the intraspecific results were not statistically significant, any 
interspecific comparisons using this data must be interpreted with caution. Similarly, the 
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small sample size of individuals within each species, as well as the small number of 
species tested here, renders interpreting species differences more difficult.  
Nonetheless, qualitatively comparing the trends observed for contrast effects and 
inequity aversion in each species can provide insight into possible evolutionary 
pressures that may have contributed to the emergence of inequity aversion in primates.  
 
Contrast Effects 
When testing for quality contrast effects, it was found that five (almost half of) 
baboon subjects, both (all of) gorilla subjects, zero gibbon subjects, and zero orangutan 
subjects responded negatively more often during the quality contrast condition than 
during the low-value control (Tables V-VIII). Notably, these baboon subjects’ refusal 
rates ranged from 10% to 40%, whereas these gorilla subjects’ refusal rates ranged 
from 6.7% to only 13.3% (Figure I). When testing for quantity contrast effects, it was 
found that six (half of) baboon subjects, both (all of) gorilla subjects, one (half of) gibbon 
subject, and two (half of) orangutan subjects responded negatively more often during 
the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Tables V-VIII). 
First, it is important to note that these results were only statistically significant for 
baboons (Table V). Second, it is important to consider that these baboon subjects’ 
refusal rates ranged from 10% to 50%, whereas these gorilla subjects’ refusal rates 
ranged from 6.7% to 40%, and these gibbon and orangutan subjects’ refusal rates were 
all only 13.3% (Figure II). 
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Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion 
None of the four species tested (olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas, white-
cheeked gibbons, or orangutans) showed significant differences in their refusal rates 
during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition as compared to the low-value 
control. However, five of the twelve (nearly half of) baboon subjects, one of the two (half 
of) gorilla subjects, and one of the two (half of) gibbon subjects responded negatively 
more often in the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than in the low-value 
control (Tables V-VII). Notably, however, these baboon subjects’ refusal rates ranged 
from 10% to 100%, whereas the gorilla and gibbon subjects’ refusal rates were both 
only 13.3% (Figure III). Orangutan subjects’ refusal rates remained at 0% (Figure III).  
A similar pattern was found when subjects were tested for disadvantageous 
inequity aversion when reward quantities differed. Four of the twelve baboon subjects, 
one of the two gorilla subjects, and one of the two gibbon subjects responded 
negatively more often during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than 
during the small-quantity control (Tables V-VII). Again, it is important to note that these 
baboon subjects’ refusal rates ranged from 10% to 80%, whereas these gorilla and 
gibbon subjects’ refusal rates were both only 13.3% (Figure IV).  Orangutan subjects’ 
refusal rates remained at 0% (Figure IV). 
 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion 
When testing for advantageous inequity aversion when reward qualities differed, 
it was found that only three baboon subjects and zero ape subjects responded 
negatively more often during the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during 
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the high-value control (Tables V-VIII). When testing for advantageous inequity aversion 
when reward quantities differed, it was found that only one baboon subject, one gorilla 
subject, and one gibbon subject responded negatively more often during the 
advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control 
(Tables V-VII). No orangutan subjects refused the reward or refused to participate when 
given a greater amount of rewards than were given to a social partner (Table VIII).  
   
Individual Trends 
 
 Although no statistically significant differences were found between any of the 
conditions for gorillas (Table VI), individual trends did exist for this species. For 
example, one gorilla individual (Kojo) responded negatively more often in both contrast 
conditions and both disadvantageous inequity conditions than they did during the 
control conditions (Figures I-IV). Similarly, the other gorilla subject (Kwame) responded 
negatively more often in both contrast conditions than they did during the control 
conditions but did not show disadvantageous inequity aversion (Figures I-IV).  
 Similar trends were found for gibbon subjects, although no statistically significant 
differences were found between conditions for this species (Table VII). For instance, 
one gibbon subject (Tuyen) responded negatively more often in both disadvantageous 
inequity conditions, the quantity contrast condition, and the advantageous inequitable 
quantity condition than they did during the control conditions (Figures II, III, IV, and VI). 
On the other hand, the other gibbon subject (Sydney) did not respond negatively to any 
of the conditions presented (Figures I-VI).  
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 Unlike gorillas and gibbons, baboon individuals’ responses were much more 
variable. However, some trends among individuals were apparent. For instance, eleven 
of the twelve baboon subjects responded negatively to at least one test condition, and 
five of the twelve baboon subjects responded negatively to at least three test conditions 
(Figures I-VI). This result was dichotomous in that an individual either responded 
negatively to only one condition, or the individual responded negatively to at least half 
of the conditions presented.  This could indicate that some individuals are more 
sensitive to inequity than others. Also, one baboon subject (27885) responded 
negatively in all of the quality test conditions, but none of the quantity test conditions 
(Figures I-VI), which may indicate that this individual was sensitive to differences in 
reward quality but not differences in reward quantity.  
 While some individual trends seem apparent in orangutans, these results should 
be interpreted with caution. For instance, one orangutan subject (Bonnie) responded to 
both contrast conditions (Figures I and II). However, this individual was not tested 
during the other conditions, so no conclusions can be made about whether this 
individual always responds negatively during test conditions. One interesting trend, 
however, is that two individuals (Kiko and Iris) did not respond to any of the conditions 
presented (Figures I-VI).  
 
Behavioral Observations 
 
After recording ad libitum instances of behavior for each primate subject, the 
number of instances of each behavior was determined for each experimental condition. 
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It was found that none of the ape subjects exhibited instances of abnormal or 
aggressive behavior (pacing, self-biting, cage-licking, yawning, or cage-banging) during 
any of the control or test conditions. Similarly, no instances of abnormal or aggressive 
behavior were observed for any of the baboon subjects during control conditions, and 
none of the baboon subjects were observed pacing or self-biting during any of the test 
conditions.  
However, some of the baboon subjects did exhibit abnormal and aggressive 
behaviors during some of the test conditions. During the quality contrast condition, one 
baboon (27885) showed three instances of cage-banging, and another baboon (26058) 
showed yawning behavior once and cage-banging behavior once. During the 
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition, one baboon (13228) showed nine 
instances of yawning, another baboon (16486) showed two instances of cage-licking, 
and a third baboon (15225) showed nine instances of cage-licking. During the 
disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition, one baboon (13228) showed seven 
instances of yawning. During the advantageous inequitable quality condition, one 
baboon (13246) showed one instance of yawning, and another baboon (16486) showed 
one instance of cage-licking. During the advantageous inequitable quantity condition, 
one baboon (26058) showed two instances of yawning. These results could indicate 
that stress levels may have been elevated in some of the individual baboon subjects 
when the individuals were given an unequal reward. However, instances of abnormal 
and aggressive behavior were not assessed for these individuals prior to 
experimentation, and therefore, this correlation should be further explored.  
 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
DISUCUSSION 
 
 
Contrast Effects 
 
Chen and Santos (2006) hypothesized that a negative response to unequal 
outcomes is a reply to a violation of previous expectations, or contrast effects, rather 
than a reply to a violation of social expectations. However, in this study, it was 
hypothesized that none of the four nonhuman primate species tested would exhibit 
contrast effects. This is because the primate subjects in this study were accustomed to 
receiving food items that were less or more preferred than food items once shown or 
given to them, and therefore, should not form expectations regarding the value or 
quantity of their provisions. It was predicted that baboons, gorillas, gibbons, and 
orangutans would not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward following task 
completion than the reward that was shown to them prior to task completion.  
Results indicated that this prediction was supported statistically for gorillas, 
gibbons, and orangutans when rewards varied by quality and when rewards varied by 
quantity. The prediction was also supported statistically for baboons when rewards 
varied by quality. However, the prediction was not supported statistically for baboons 
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when rewards varied by quantity. There was a statistically significant difference 
between baboons’ refusal rates during the quantity contrast effects condition -- in which 
the subjects were shown three pieces of low-value reward prior to task completion but 
were only given one piece of low-value reward following task completion—and baboons’ 
refusal rates during the low-value control – in which the subjects were shown one piece 
of low-value reward prior to task completion and were given one piece of low-value 
reward following task completion. This suggests that baboons may have individual 
expectations about the amount of rewards they receive following the completion of a 
task, but they may not have individual expectations about the quality of rewards they 
receive following task completion.  
While the baboon subjects in this study have, in the past, often received food 
items that are less or more preferred than food items once shown or given to them, the 
baboons may not be accustomed to a change in reward value following the completion 
of a task. It is possible that requiring the monkeys to put in effort by completing a task 
causes their individual expectations about rewards to change, because they may 
expect similar rewards each time a task is completed. This would be consistent with 
prior studies that showed that subjects’ reward refusal rates were lower when food 
provisions were given in the absence of a task than when the subjects were required to 
“work” for their food rewards (Brosnan et al., 2010; Talbot et al., 2011). However, this 
does not explain why baboons react negatively to receiving a lesser amount of rewards 
than previously shown to them but do not react negatively to receiving a lower quality 
reward than previously shown to them.  
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Although the results from this study suggest that the expectations about quality 
and quantity are decoupled, it would still be expected that individual expectations 
following task completion would be consistent regardless of whether the individual was 
expecting a certain quality or quantity of rewards. From an ecological perspective, it 
would make sense that individuals would wish to maximize the amount of food available 
to them, perhaps leading to enhanced individual expectations about food quantity. One 
explanation for the differences seen between quality contrast effects and quantity 
contrast effects in olive baboons may be related to within-group food competition and 
dominance rank. For instance, one study showed that dominance rank in olive baboons 
was significantly correlated with the amount of food intake but not with food quality 
(Barton and Whiten, 1993), suggesting that food competition was enhanced when the 
amount of food was reduced but not when the food available varied by quality. This 
may suggest that increased within-group food competition led to an increase in the 
selective pressure to form expectations about the amount of food an individual should 
receive; this may also explain why baboons respond negatively to quantity contrast 
effects but not quality contrast effects.  
Although food competition may not be as pronounced for western-lowland 
gorillas, white-cheeked gibbons, and orangutans, the possibility that these species 
exhibit quantity contrast effects cannot be rule out at this time. Because only a small 
number of gorillas, gibbons, and orangutans were tested in this study, it is possible that 
these species also respond negatively to receiving a lesser amount of rewards than 
previously shown to them, and the small sample size is the cause of the statistically 
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nonsignificant result. Therefore, quantity contrast effects should be further explored in 
these species.  
 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion 
 
In opposition to Chen and Santos (2006), Brosnan and de Waal (2003) 
hypothesized that a negative response to unequal outcomes is a reaction to a violation 
of social expectations, as opposed to a violation of previous expectations. This 
suggests that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with an increase in cooperative 
relationships with non-kin group members in species living in large, complex social 
groups (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). This hypothesis has thus far been supported 
considering only chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), 
and macaques (Macaca mulatta and Macaca fascicularis) have been shown to be 
inequity averse, while orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri 
sciureus and Saimiri boliviensis), owl monkeys (Aotus), marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), 
and tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) did not respond to inequitable outcomes (Brosnan 
and de Waal, 2014).   
In the current study, it was therefore hypothesized that primate species which 
typically cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members would show 
aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Because olive baboons 
and western-lowland gorillas are species which typically live in large social groups 
(greater than four individuals) and show cooperation among non-kin, non-pair-bonded 
group members, these species were expected to respond negatively after receiving a 
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lesser reward than their social partner. It was also predicted that gibbons and 
orangutans would not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their 
social partner, because gibbons and orangutans do not live in large social groups and 
do not typically cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics.  
The predictions were supported statistically for gibbons and orangutans but not 
for baboons and gorillas. Although no statistically significant differences in refusal rates 
between the disadvantageous inequity conditions and the control conditions were found 
for any of the four species in the current study, there was a similar trend in results for 
baboons, gorillas, gibbons, and orangutans. This was true when rewards varied by 
quality and when rewards varied by quantity. None of the orangutan subjects tested 
responded negatively to disadvantageous inequity in the quality or quantity conditions. 
However, nearly half of the baboon subjects and exactly half of the gorilla and gibbon 
individuals tested had higher refusal rates during disadvantageous inequity conditions 
than during control conditions. This suggests that a tendency for baboons, gorillas, and 
gibbons to recognize and respond negatively to unequal reward distributions should not 
yet be rejected. Based on the small sample size of individuals tested for each species 
in this study, it is possible that future studies could find statistically significant 
differences in response rates for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons.  
Importantly, the results found for orangutans in this study match the results 
found in a previous study that examined inequity aversion in orangutans (Brosnan et al., 
2011). In this and a previous study, orangutans were tested for inequity aversion using 
a method which required the subjects to alternate exchanging a token for a food reward 
with a social partner. It was found that the seven orangutan subjects tested in the 
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previous study (Brosnan et al., 2011) and the two orangutans tested here did not have 
higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequity conditions as compared to the 
control conditions. Considering orangutans were the only species tested in the current 
study that have been previously tested in inequity experiments, this similarity in results 
across studies could be considered validation for the current study’s methodology.  
While the predictions made about disadvantageous inequity aversion for 
baboons, gorillas, and gibbons were not supported statistically, a few important points 
should be taken into consideration. It is imperative to note that an absence of 
performance in an individual does not equate to an absence of ability to respond. While 
an individual’s negative reaction can be interpreted as an ability to recognize 
differences in reward distribution, the absence of a negative reaction does not indicate 
the absence of an ability to recognize unequal reward allocations.  
One possibility for the lack of consistency among baboon, gorilla, and gibbon 
responses to inequity could be attributed to individual differences within the trait. For 
instance, in one study of chimpanzees by Brosnan and colleagues (2015), no 
differences were found between some chimpanzees’ refusal rates during the inequity 
condition and the individuals’ refusal rates during the control condition (Brosnan et al., 
2015). These results were unexpectedly contradictory to those found in another study 
of chimpanzee inequity aversion led by some of the same researchers, in which 
chimpanzee’s refusal rates statistically differed across conditions (Brosnan et al., 2010). 
Additionally, a study of bonobo inequity aversion found that some subjects responded 
negatively to receiving unequal rewards, but the results were not statistically significant 
65 
 
 
(Brauer et al., 2009); this is similar to the results found for baboons, gorillas, and 
gibbons in this study. 
Importantly, observing individual differences in a behavioral trait is not unique to 
inequity aversion; individual variation both within and across nonhuman primate species 
has been recorded in several additional cognitive and behavioral traits in primates. For 
example, one study showed that only one out of eleven chimpanzees tested for mirror 
self-recognition actually exhibited the behavior (Swartz and Evans, 1991), whereas 
another study showed that all four chimpanzees tested were able to recognize 
themselves in mirrors (Gallup, 1970). Similarly, individual variation in mirror self-
recognition was found for both gibbons and gorillas. For instance, several studies 
showed no evidence of the behavior in gibbons (Hyatt, 1998; Inoue-Nakamura, 1997; 
Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009), but one study did show that hylobatids are 
capable of mirror self-recognition (Ujhelyi et al, 2000). In gorillas, some evidence of 
mark-directed behaviors in the presence of mirrors has been found (Matsuzawa, 2001) 
while one study did not show evidence of the behavior in this species (Suarez and 
Gallup, 1981). These results pertaining to gibbons and gorillas are especially important 
when considering the results of the current study of inequity aversion; the previous 
mirror self-recognition studies show that individual variation within a behavioral trait is 
not unusual for these two nonhuman primate groups. 
In an attempt to explain why only some baboons, gorillas, and gibbons 
responded with higher refusal rates during the inequity condition, the data were 
qualitatively examined for correlations between refusal rates and demographic 
variables, such as age, sex, dominance rank, social group size, and rearing history. 
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However, no pattern was found that would correlate inequity aversion with any of these 
characteristics. Primate subjects which responded negatively to inequity varied across 
sex, age, dominance rank, social group size, and rearing history both within and 
between species (Tables 1-3).  
Similarly, responses to inequity do not appear to be related to the strength of the 
pair’s social relationship. This is assumed because all baboon subjects were introduced 
to their partner at the start of experimentation, and the strength of relationship was 
presumed to be similar for all pairs in this species. This would be consistent with a 
recent study of chimpanzee inequity aversion, in which no correlation was found 
between inequity aversion and the length of time chimpanzee subjects had lived with 
their experimental partner (Brosnan et al., 2015). However, the results from the current 
study should be interpreted with caution, as the strength of relationship between 
individuals in each pair was not quantified. Future studies may benefit from using an 
established sociality index (Silk and Alberts, 2006) to assess bonds between individuals 
in each pair prior to testing pairs for inequity aversion.  
It is possible that inequity aversion varies among individuals for reasons other 
than those that can be explained by demographic characteristics. For example, 
individual variation in inequity aversion has been observed in humans, in which 
responses appear to be context-dependent. Human inequity responses vary by culture 
(Paulus, 2015; Shaw and Olson, 2012), the subjects’ goals (Skitka, 2012) and whether 
inequity is related to productivity (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990) or cooperation (Leung, 
1986). This may suggest that several species, including baboons, gorillas, and gibbons, 
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exhibit individual variation in inequity responses that is unrelated to demographic 
characteristics. 
One recent study exposed the individual variation in inequity aversion that can 
result from using different methodological paradigms within the same species, even 
when both paradigms require a task. The first study of inequity aversion in nonhuman 
primates showed that capuchin monkeys were inequity averse when required to 
complete a token-exchange task, in which the subject would receive either a lesser or 
greater reward than a social partner after task completion (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2003). However, Sheskin and colleagues (2014) used a different experimental 
procedure and found contradictory results. In this study, capuchin monkeys were 
required to choose between experimenters, who each gave the subject the same 
reward; however, one experimenter gave the subject’s partner a lesser reward, and the 
other experimenter gave the subject’s partner a greater reward (Sheskin et al., 2014). 
The results showed that capuchin monkeys did not respond differently to equal and 
unequal reward distributions (Sheskin et al., 2014), which contradicted the results 
previously found for capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003).  
While several researchers have highlighted the importance of a task for eliciting 
inequity aversion (Brosnan, 2013; Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et al., 2010; 
Hopper et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), the study by 
Sheskin and colleagues (2014) was the first to show that even when a task is used, 
other procedural differences may lead to differing responses in inequity. The variation in 
inequity responses found for capuchin monkeys suggests that inequity aversion may be 
context-dependent for nonhuman primates. However, the tasks used in this study were 
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identical to those used in previous studies that indicated the presence of inequity 
aversion in nonhuman primates (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004; Talbot et al., 2011). Most 
importantly, the procedure used for each subject was identical to that used for the 
subject’s partner. For this reason, it could be assumed that the experimental procedure 
used here is not the cause of the intraspecific individual variation observed in this study. 
However, nonhuman primates may be sensitive to subtle variation in procedures that 
were not apparent to the experimenter. In this case, potential subtle variation in 
methodology cannot, at this point, be excluded as a cause of individual differences in 
inequity responses. 
Another recent study suggested that variation within inequity responses may be 
related to variation within personality traits. This study showed that certain personality 
variables characterized to the chimpanzee subjects (determined by caretaker 
questionnaires; see Freeman et al., 2013) significantly affected individual refusal rates 
during inequity testing (Brosnan et al., 2015). Chimpanzees which were rated more 
highly on the “extraversion” variable were more likely to stop participating in the task or 
refuse food rewards; individuals which scored more highly on the “openness,” 
“agreeableness,” “reactivity,” and “dominance” variables, however, had lower overall 
refusal rates (Brosnan et al., 2015:83). It is possible that the individual variation in 
inequity aversion found for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons, similar to that found in 
chimpanzees, is also due to differences in personality traits of the subjects. However, 
personality data for the individuals tested in this study are not currently available, and 
therefore, this correlation must be further explored. 
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In addition to differences in personality and subtle procedural differences, other 
possible explanations for the individual variation in inequity responses observed for 
gibbons in particular cannot be ignored. One explanation for the variation in responses 
between the two gibbon subjects may be related to vigilance toward the subject’s 
partner. The gibbon subject who had higher refusal rates during inequity conditions than 
control conditions was observed not to be consistently vigilant toward their social 
partner during testing. Therefore, it was not fully clear that this individual was 
continuously aware of rewards shown to and received by their partner. In contrast, the 
second gibbon subject appeared to be consistently vigilant toward their partner during 
inequity testing. It is possible that the results found for gibbons do not indicate the 
presence of inequity aversion in the subject which responded to unequal reward 
distributions and may not accurately reflect this species’ tendency toward inequity 
aversion. Instead, the refusal to participate in the task may have been due to a lack of 
vigilance toward their social partner, due to factors such as distractions in the subject’s 
environment or a general disinterest in their partner. 
A second possible explanation for why one gibbon subject reacted negatively to 
inequity, but the other did not, may be due to the short relationship duration for the pair. 
It is known that adult gibbons typically form strong social bonds with an opposite-sex 
conspecific (Reichard and Boesch, 2003; Palombit, 1996), and it was predicted that 
gibbons would not be inequity averse given their small group size and lack of 
cooperation with non-kin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics. However, it has been 
suggested that pair-living partners with a newly formed relationship are more likely to 
respond negatively to unequal outcomes than partners with a longer relationship 
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history, because replacing a social partner is less costly for the former individuals 
(DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). Notably, the gibbon subject which responded 
negatively to unequal reward allocations in this study had been recently moved to the 
National Zoological Park and was introduced to their partner only 9 months prior to 
inequity testing. The fact that this gibbon subject recently formed a new relationship 
with their social partner could explain why this subject responded negatively to 
disadvantageous inequity, although the relatively new partnership was likewise true for 
the individual who did not show inequity aversion tendencies. It is possible that the 
change in location in addition to the newly formed relationship caused the apparently 
inequity averse gibbon subject to respond in a possibly anomalous manner. Future 
studies of inequity aversion in gibbons would benefit from studying pairs which have 
lived together for longer durations in order to determine whether the results found here 
are anomalous for this species.   
 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion 
 
It was hypothesized that species which are group-living and which cooperate 
with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group mates would be inequity averse. It was also 
hypothesized that individuals within these species and which have a strong relationship 
with their social partner will show aversive reactions to advantageous inequitable 
outcomes. It was predicted that the gorilla subjects tested would respond negatively 
after receiving a greater reward than their social partner, because the gorilla subjects 
met these criteria; gorillas typically live in large groups and cooperate with non-kin 
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conspecifics, and the gorilla subjects tested were full-siblings that have lived together 
for thirteen years (indicating that they presumably had a strong social relationship). It 
was also predicted that baboons, gibbons, and orangutans would not respond 
negatively after receiving a greater reward than their social partner. This was because 
gibbons and orangutans are not large-group living species which cooperate with non-
kin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics, and the baboon subjects tested had no prior 
exposure to their social partners; therefore, the baboon subjects were not presumed to 
have strong social relationships.  
The prediction was supported statistically for baboons, gibbons, and orangutans 
but was not supported statistically for gorillas. The results indicated that there was no 
significant difference in refusal rates during the advantageous inequity conditions as 
compared to the control conditions for any of the four species tested. This was true 
when rewards varied by quality as well as when rewards varied by quantity. Only one of 
the two gorillas had a higher refusal rate when they were given a greater amount of 
rewards than their social partner as compared to their refusal rate during the large-
quantity control. Furthermore, neither of the two gorillas had higher refusal rates when 
they were given a greater value reward than their social partner as compared to their 
refusal rates during the high-value control.  
Notably, one baboon subject had a higher refusal rate when they were given a 
greater amount of rewards than their social partner as compared to their refusal rate 
during the large-quantity control. Similarly, three baboon subjects had higher refusal 
rates when they were given a greater value reward than their social partner as 
compared to their refusal rates during the high-value control. This result was especially 
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surprising considering none of the baboon subjects had a prior relationship with their 
conspecific partner.  
One possible reason why no significant differences were found between gorillas’ 
responses during advantageous inequity conditions and their responses during control 
conditions is that the sample size was too small to detect statistically significant 
differences. It is also possible that the social relationship of the gorilla pair did not differ 
substantially from the relationships of the other species. No direct measure of social 
relationship strength was conducted, and social relationship strength was assumed a 
priori as an outcome of social structure. However, such an assumption may be 
inadequate to reveal subtle differences in the response to inequitable rewards. 
Another plausible explanation is that advantageous inequity aversion is not 
related to the strength of the relationship between subject and partner. This would be 
consistent with recent results found in a study of chimpanzee inequity aversion, in 
which no correlation was found between inequity aversion and the length of time 
chimpanzee subjects had lived with their experimental partner (Brosnan et al., 2015). 
Although humans respond negatively to inequity more often when they have a stronger 
relationship with their social partner and when partners have spent more time together, 
this may not be true for nonhuman primates. However, little data has been collected to 
test this in nonhuman primates, and therefore, this idea should be further explored. 
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Addressing the Evolution of Inequity Aversion 
 
Although some olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked 
gibbons showed negative responses to inequitable outcomes, these observations must 
be considered preliminary as they were not statistically significant. Because of the 
mixed nature of the results, i.e. some baboons, gorillas, and gibbons did not show 
inequity aversion while other members of these species did, it is difficult to label these 
species as inequity averse. Therefore, using this data to make assumptions about 
whether the trait is homologous or homoplastic for primate lineages becomes even 
more complicated.  
In contrast to the mixed results found for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons, none of 
the orangutan subjects in this study responded negatively to unequal reward 
distributions. This confirmed the results from a prior study of orangutan inequity 
aversion (Brosnan et al., 2011) and suggests that inequity aversion is unlikely to be 
present in orangutans. With regard to orangutans, this data can more easily be used to 
address the question of whether inequity aversion is a homology or homoplasy in apes.  
If future tests of larger samples of western-lowland gorillas and white-cheeked 
gibbons show that these species are inequity averse, a few hypotheses could be made 
about the evolution of inequity aversion in the superfamily Hominoidea. The presence 
of inequity aversion in humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and gibbons would 
mean that orangutans are the only ape species that is not averse to inequitable 
outcomes. This may suggest that inequity aversion is homologous, that it may have 
already been present in the last common ancestor of all apes, and that it was 
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secondarily lost only in orangutans. In this case, evolutionary pressures that would have 
led to the loss of inequity aversion in orangutans would have to be further explored.  
If gorillas and gibbons were suggested to be inequity averse, it would also be 
possible for inequity aversion to have been absent in the last common ancestor of all 
apes. This would suggest that present-day inequity aversion in apes is a homoplasic 
trait that evolved independently in all ape lineages except Pongo, although this is the 
least parsimonious explanation. In this case, it would be necessary to explore the 
possible socioecological pressures that would have caused inequity aversion to evolve 
in gibbons, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans.  
If future tests of western-lowland gorillas and white-cheeked gibbons show that 
these species are not averse to inequitable outcomes, it is likely that inequity aversion 
is homoplastic for the superfamily Hominoidea. Because it is rare for a trait to be lost in 
several species in one lineage, it is unlikely that inequity aversion was present in the 
last common ancestors of apes, but secondarily lost in orangutans, gorillas, and 
gibbons. Nonetheless, it would be necessary to explore evolutionary pressures that 
could lead to the loss of inequity aversion in these three species of the Hominoidea 
lineage.  
If future tests of a larger sample of olive baboons can confirm that this species is 
inequity averse, a few additional hypotheses about the evolution of inequity aversion 
could be made. Considering rhesus macaques and long-tailed macaques have been 
suggested to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen 
et al., 2012), inequity aversion could be a homologous trait in the subfamily 
Cercopithecinae and in the superfamily Cercopithecoidea. As only three Old World 
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monkeys have now been tested for inequity aversion, even if all three species were 
considered inequity averse, it is still possible that the trait is homoplastic for Old World 
monkey lineages. For instance, olive baboons, rhesus macaques, and long-tailed 
macaques may have evolved inequity aversion in response to similar socioecological 
pressures, such as increased cooperation among non-kin group members. Additional 
members of the subfamily Cercopithecinae, such as vervet monkeys, and additional 
members of the superfamily Cercopithecoidea, such as colobus monkeys of the 
subfamily Colobinae, would need to be tested for inequity aversion to better understand 
the evolution of the trait in these lineages and to come to a better conclusion of the 
trait’s existence at higher taxonomic nodes, including all Old World monkeys. 
If future tests of olive baboons suggest that this species is not averse to 
inequitable outcomes, there could be more than one evolutionary explanation for the 
trait’s absence in this species. It is possible that inequity aversion could be a 
homologous trait in the subfamily Cercopithecinae and in the superfamily 
Cercopithecoidea, but the trait was secondarily lost in olive baboons. It is also possible 
that inequity aversion is a homoplasy for Old World monkeys; it would then follow that 
perhaps only macaques or only some macaque species were exposed to evolutionary 
pressures that led to the emergence of the trait, whereas olive baboons were not 
subjected to these evolutionary pressures. Studying additional Old World monkey 
species is a necessary requirement to advance the question of the evolution of inequity 
aversion and would help to better understand this distinction. 
Given that humans and four species of nonhuman primates have been shown to 
be inequity averse, while several other species did not respond to inequitable outcomes 
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(Brosnan and de Waal, 2014), it may be argued that it is unlikely that inequity aversion 
is homologous for the order Primates. However, individual variation in the trait was 
found even in species that do show inequity aversion, such as humans (Paulus, 2015; 
Pruitt, 1985; Skitka, 2012), chimpanzees (Brosnan et al., 2015) and bonobos (Brauer et 
al., 2009), and now this study extends this list to include olive baboons, western-
lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons. Considering only a small number of 
individuals from each nonhuman primate species have been tested for inequity 
aversion, it seems possible that the samples may have contained some individuals from 
each species that may respond differently from their conspecifics. Therefore, it is too 
soon to rule out the possibility that all primates are capable of responding negatively to 
unequal reward distributions. In conclusion, a homology of inequity aversion for the 
order Primates is still a possibility, suggesting that inequity aversion could have been 
present in the last common ancestor of primates.  
More species within the class Mammalia need to be investigated if future studies 
of primate inequity aversion show that the trait may be homologous in the order 
Primates. A few studies already suggest that inequity aversion may be present in non-
primate mammals, such as domestic dogs (Range et al., 2009), which have been 
shown to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes. Researchers have interpreted 
these results to suggest that inequity aversion evolved in domestic dogs in response to 
an increase in cooperative relationships in this species (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). 
Testing for inequity aversion in mammalian species which do not live in large groups or 
cooperate with non-kin conspecifics, such as gray foxes (Lord, 1961), could highlight 
whether the trait may have evolved in response to increased cooperation and could 
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also lead to inferences about whether the trait may be homologous for the class 
Mammalia.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
There are several possibilities as to why no statistically significant results were 
found to support the overall hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between 
inequity aversion and species sociality. One explanation is that the sample size in this 
study was too small to detect statistically significant differences between conditions. 
While a sample size of twenty nonhuman primate subjects is relatively large compared 
to previous studies of inequity aversion (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011), 
incorporating only two western-lowland gorillas, two white-cheeked gibbons, four 
orangutans, and twelve olive baboons may not have be adequate to detect within-
species responses to unequal resource distributions. Similarly, including only four 
species in a study of inequity aversion may not have given an accurate account of 
between-species differences in inequity aversion. Therefore, future studies of 
nonhuman primate inequity aversion should attempt to maximize both the number of 
individuals within a species as well as the number of species tested in a given study.  
A second explanation for a lack of statistical support for nonhuman primate 
inequity aversion in this study is the possibility that sociality was inadequately assessed. 
For example, this study considered both orangutans and gibbons to be “semi-social” 
(i.e. they do not live in large groups or cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded 
conspecifics). Additionally, gorillas and baboons were both considered to be “social” 
78 
 
 
(i.e. they live in large social groups and cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded group 
members). However, this “social”/”semi-social” dichotomy greatly simplifies each 
species’ social relations with conspecifics and omits important differences between the 
four species’ social organizations.  
For example, it is important to recognize the differences between orangutan and 
gibbon social organizations. Orangutans, for instance, are considered solitary foragers 
which have only brief social interactions with non-kin conspecifics (Mitani et al., 1991; te 
Boekhorst et al., 1990). Gibbons, on the other hand, form strong pair-bonds with a non-
relative conspecific and spend a large amount of time interacting and cooperating with 
that individual (Reichard and Boesch, 2003; Palombit, 1996). While white-cheeked 
gibbons, like orangutans, do not typically cooperate with multiple individuals of their 
species, it may not be appropriate to consider gibbons as equally “semi-social” as 
orangutans.  
Likewise, western-lowland gorillas and olive baboons have very different social 
structures. For example, western-lowland gorillas often live in family groups averaging 
nine individuals (Yamagiwa et al., 2003) and consisting of one or two males and 
multiple females or in bachelor groups of all adult males (Doran and McNeilage, 1998). 
Olive baboons, on the other hand, typically live in multi-male, multi-female, fission-
fusion societies, averaging between 15 and 150 individuals (Barton et al, 1996; Dunbar 
and Dunbar, 1974; Ray and Sapolsky, 1992; Rowel, 1966). Considering western-
lowland gorillas and olive baboons to be equally “social” greatly reduces the important 
variation between the social organizations of these two species.  
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Given the vast variation in social structure among all nonhuman primate species, 
future studies examining the relationship between primate inequity aversion and 
species sociality may benefit from reassessing the definition of sociality. Specifically, it 
may be favorable to consider sociality as a continuous variable, as opposed to a 
dichotomous characteristic. If sociality was assessed as a continuous variable, it may 
better explain why the most social species tested in this study, olive baboons, had the 
highest refusal rates during most of the test conditions, why the intermediately social 
species, gorillas and gibbons, had intermediate refusal rates, and why the least social 
species, the orangutans, had the lowest refusal rates (Figures I-VI). Although it is 
feasible that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with increased cooperation among 
individuals living in large groups of conspecifics, more meaningful variation in inequity 
aversion between different cooperative, group-living species may be found by treating 
sociality as a continuous variable.  
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE I. Baboon Demographic Characteristics 
 
Pair # Subject 
ID 
Relationship 
w/ Partner 
Age Sex Group 
Size 
Group Composition 
1 27666 None 9 Male 8 All 9-10 y.o. adult males 
1 27885 None 9 Male 4 All 8-10 y.o. adult males 
2 13228 None 19 Female 12 One adult male, eleven 11-21 y.o. females 
2 26058 None 10 Female 13 One adult male, twelve 11 y.o. females 
3 13246 None 19 Female 11 One adult male, nine 13-20 y.o. females, 
one infant 
3 16486 None 14 Female 14 One adult male, thirteen 10-13 y.o. 
females 
4 15225 None 16 Male 8 All 11-18 y.o. adult males 
4 14068 None 17 Male 6 All 11-15 y.o. adult males 
5 28420 None 9 Male 4 All 9 y.o. adult males 
5 14528 None 17 Male 9 One adult male, eight 12-17 y.o. females 
6 14800 None 22 Female 9 All 18-22 y.o. adult females 
6 11284 None 17 Female 11 One adult male, nine 13-20 y.o. females, 
one infant 
 
 
TABLE II. Additional Baboon Characteristics  
 
Pair # Subjec
t ID 
Rearing History Days in 
Clinic 
Cage Size Reason for Clinic Stay 
1 27666 Mother-reared until 10 months 5 1 x 1.2 m Left rear foot injury 
1 27885 Mother-reared until 10 months 13 1 x 1.2 m Lacerated left hand 
2 13228 Nursery-reared 8 1 x 1.2 m Lacerated tail 
2 26058 Mother-reared 7 1 x 1.2 m Multiple body lacerations 
3 13246 Mother-reared 85 1 x 1.2 m Fractured left arm 
3 16486 Mother-reared until 9 months 78 1 x 1.2 m Fractured left arm 
4 15225 Mother-reared until 11 months 15 1 x 1.2 m Lacerated left cheek 
4 14068 Mother-reared until 9 months 13 1 x 1.2 m Weight loss 
5 28420 Mother-reared until 12 months 31 1.5 x 1.8 m Lacerated right hand 
5 14528 Mother-reared until 10 months 3 1 x 1.2 m Cheek abscess 
6 14800 Mother-reared until 10 months 5 1 x 1.2 m Hair growth 
6 11284 Mother-reared until 6 months 4 1 x 1.2 m Sedation recovery 
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TABLE III. Ape Demographic Characteristics 
 
Pair # Subject 
ID 
Species Relationship 
w/ Partner 
Age Sex Group 
Size 
Group Composition 
7 Kwame Gorilla Full siblings 15 Male 2 Two adult males 
7 Kojo Gorilla Full siblings 13 Male 2 Two adult males 
8 Sydney Gibbon Bonded pair 15 Male 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
8 Tuyen Gibbon Bonded pair 8 Female 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
9 Kiko Orangutan Bonded pair 27 Male 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
9 Iris Orangutan Bonded pair 28 Female 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
10 Kyle Orangutan Bonded pair 18 Male 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
10 Bonnie Orangutan Bonded pair 38 Female 2 One adult male, one adult 
female 
 
TABLE IV. Conditions and Rewards for all Primate Subjects  
 
Test Condition 
Control 
Condition 
Reward 
Shown to 
Subject 
Reward 
Given to 
Subject 
Reward 
Shown to 
Partner 
Reward 
Given to 
Partner 
Quality Contrast  
Low-value 
Control High-value Low-value High-value Low-value 
Quantity Contrast 
Small-quantity 
Control 
3 pieces low-
value 
1 piece low-
value 
3 pieces low-
value 
1 piece low-
value 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity-Quality 
Low-value 
Control Low-value Low-value High-value High-value 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity-Quantity 
Small-quantity 
Control 
1 piece low-
value 
1 piece low-
value 
3 pieces low-
value 
3 pieces low-
value 
Advantageous 
Inequity-Quality 
High-value 
Control High-value High-value Low-value Low-value 
Advantageous 
Inequity-Quantity 
Large-quantity 
Control 
3 pieces low-
value 
3 pieces low-
value 
1 piece low-
value 
1 piece low-
value 
 
TABLE V. Test Results for Baboons 
 
Test  
Ratio of 
Individuals which 
Responded 
Z 
value 
p 
value 
Quality Contrast Effects 5 out of 12 -1.134 0.257 
Quantity Contrast Effects 6 out of 12 -2.449 0.014 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 7 out of 12 -1.134 0.257 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 6 out of 12 -0.816 0.414 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 3 out of 12 -1.732 0.083 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 2 out of 12 -1.000 0.317 
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TABLE VI. Test Results for Gorillas 
 
Test  
Ratio of 
Individuals which 
Responded 
Z 
value 
p 
value 
Quality Contrast Effects 2 out of 2 -1.414 0.157 
Quantity Contrast Effects 2 out of 2 -1.414 0.157 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 1 out of 2 -1.000 0.317 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 1 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
 
 
TABLE VII. Test Results for Gibbons 
 
Test  
Ratio of 
Individuals which 
Responded 
Z 
value 
p 
value 
Quality Contrast Effects 0 out of 2 -1.000 0.317 
Quantity Contrast Effects 1 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 1 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 1 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 1 out of 2 -1.000 0.317 
 
 
TABLE VIII. Test Results for Orangutans 
 
Test  
Ratio of 
Individuals which 
Responded 
Z 
value 
p 
value 
Quality Contrast Effects 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Quantity Contrast Effects 2 out of 4 -1.414 0.157 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity 0 out of 2 0.000 1.000 
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TABLE IX. Results of Friedman’s Tests  
 
Species 5 Quality Conditions 5 Quantity Conditions All 10 Conditions 
Baboons Χ
2
 = 7.447, p = .114 Χ
2
 = 13.491, p = .009 Χ
2
 = 20.810, p = .014 
Gorillas Χ
2
 = 6.400, p = .171 Χ
2
 = 4.000, p = .406 Χ
2
 = 11.824, p = .223 
Gibbons Χ
2
 = 4.000, p = .406 Χ
2
 = 1.857, p = .762 Χ
2
 = 6.581, p = .681 
Orangutans N/A N/A N/A 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE I. Contrast effects when rewards varied by quality. Refusal rates of each 
nonhuman primate subject during the quality contrast condition compared to refusal 
rates during the low-value control.  
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FIGURE II. Contrast effects when rewards varied by quantity. Refusal rates of each 
nonhuman primate subject during the quantity contrast condition compared to refusal 
rates during the small-quantity control.  
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FIGURE III. Disadvantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality. Refusal 
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the disadvantageous inequitable quality 
condition compared to refusal rates during the low-value control. 
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FIGURE IV. Disadvantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quantity. 
Refusal rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the disadvantageous 
inequitable quantity condition compared to refusal rates during the small-quantity 
control. 
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FIGURE V. Advantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality. Refusal 
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the advantageous inequitable quality 
condition compared to refusal rates during the high-value control. 
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FIGURE VI. Advantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quantity. Refusal 
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the advantageous inequitable quantity 
condition compared to refusal rates during the large-quantity control. 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Barnard AM, Hughes KD, Gerhardt RR, DiVincenti Jr, L, Bovee JM, Cantlon JF. 2013. 
Inherently analog quantity representations in olive baboons (Papio 
anubis). Number without language: comparative psychology and the evolution of 
numerical cognition: 76. 
Barton RA, Byrne RW, Whiten A. 1996. Ecology, feeding competition and social 
structure in baboons. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 38(5):321-329.  
Barton RA, Whiten A. 1993. Feeding competition among female olive baboons, Papio 
anubis. Animal Behaviour 46(4):777-789. 
Beran MJ. 2007. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) enumerate large and small 
sequentially presented sets of items using analog numerical 
representations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes 33(1):42. 
Beran MJ. 2001. Summation and numerousness judgments of sequentially presented 
sets of items by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative 
Psychology 115(2):181. 
Beran MJ. Evans, T.A. and Harris, E.H., 2008. Perception of food amounts by 
chimpanzees based on the number, size, contour length and visibility of 
items. Animal Behaviour 75(5): 1793-1802. 
91 
 
 
Bercovitch FB. 2006. Coalitions, cooperation and reproductive tactics among adult male 
baboons. Animal Behaviour 36(4):1198-1209. 
Boesch C. 1994. Cooperative hunting in wild chimpanzees. Animal Behaviour 48: 653-
667. 
Boysen, S.T. and Berntson, G.G., 1995. Responses to quantity: perceptual versus 
cognitive mechanisms in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 21(1):82. 
Brannon EM, Terrace HS. 1998. Ordering of the numerosities 1 to 9 by 
monkeys. Science 282(5389):746-749. 
Brauer J, Call J, Tomasello M. 2006. Are apes really inequity averse? New data on the 
token-exchange paradigm. American Journal of Primatology 71(2):175-181.  
Brauer J, Call J, Tomasello M. 2009. Are apes really inequity averse? Proceedings of 
the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 273(1605):3123-3128.  
Brosnan SF. 2013. Justice and fairness related behaviors in non-human primates. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110:10416-10423.  
Brosnan SF. 2011. A hypothesis of coevolution between cooperation and responses to 
inequity. Frontiers in Neurosciene [Hypothesis and Theory] 5(43):1-12.  
Brosnan SF, de Waal FB. 2014. Evolution of responses to (un)fairness. Science 
346(6207):1251776-1 - 1251776-7. 
Brosnan SF, de Waal FB. 2012. Fairness in Animals: Where to from Here? Social 
Justice Research 25:336-351.  
Brosnan SF, de Waal FB. 2005. A simple response to barter in chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes). Primates 46:173-182. 
92 
 
 
Brosnan SF, de Waal FBM. 2004a. A concept of value during experimental exchange in 
brown capuchin monkeys. Folia Primatologica 75:317–330. 
Brosnan SF, de Waal FB. 2004b. Socially learned preferences for differentially 
rewarded tokens in the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). J Comp Psychol 
118:133-139. 
Brosnan SF and de Waal FB. 2003. Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature 425:297-299. 
Brosnan SF, Flemming T, Talbot CF, Mayo L, Stoinski T. 2011. Orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus) Do Not Form Expectations Based on Their Partner’s Outcomes. Folia 
Primatologica 82(1):56-70. 
Brosnan SF, Hopper LM, Richey S, Freeman HD, Talbot CF, Gosling SD, Lambeth SP, 
Schapiro SJ. 2015. Personality influences responses to inequity and contrast in 
chimpanzees. Animal behaviour 101:75-87. 
Brosnan SF, Schiff HC, de Waal FB. 2005. Tolerance for inequity may increase with 
social closeness in chimpanzees. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 
Series B 1560:253-258. 
Brosnan SF, Talbot C, Ahlgren M, Lambeth SP, Shapiro SJ. 2010. Mechanisms 
underlying responses to inequitable outcomes in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). 
Animal Behaviour 79:1229-1327.  
Chen KM, Santos LR. 2006. Some Thoughts on the Adaptive Function of Inequity 
Aversion: An Alternative to Brosnan’s Social Hypothesis. Social Justice 
Research 19(2):201-207.  
Cheney DL, Moscovice LR, Heesen M, Mundry R, Seyfarth RM. 2010. Contingent 
cooperation between wild female baboons. PNAS 107(21):9562–9566. 
93 
 
 
Corning P. 2011. The Fair Society: The Science of Human Nature and the Pursuit of 
Social Justice. The University of Chicago Press.  
Cronin KA. 2012. Prosocial behaviour in animals: The influence of social relationships, 
communication and rewards. Animal Behaviour 84:1085-1093. 
DeAngelo G, Brosnan SF. 2013. The importance of risk tolerance and knowledge when 
considering the evolution of inequity responses across the primates. Journal of 
Economic and Behavioral Organization 90:105-112.  
Doran DM, Mcneilage A. 1998. Gorilla ecology and behavior. Evolutionary 
anthropology: Issues, news, and reviews 6(4):120-131. 
Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. 2014. Who cooperates in repeated games: The role 
of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 98:41-55.  
Dunbar RIM, Dunbar EP. 1974. Ecological relations and niche separation between 
sympatric terrestrial primates in Ethiopia . Folia Primatol 21:36-60. 
Englmaier F, Wambach A. 2010. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. 
Games and Economic Behavior 69(2):312-328.  
Fehr E, Schmidt KM. 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Cooperation, and Competition. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3):817-868.  
Freeman HD, Brosnan SF, Hopper LM, Lambeth SP, Schapiro SJ, Gosling SD. 2013. 
Developing a comprehensive and comparative questionnaire for measuring 
personality in chimpanzees using a simultaneous topdown/bottomup design: 
chimpanzee personality. American Journal of Primatology:75. 
94 
 
 
Freeman HJ, Sullivan J, Hooper LM, Talbot CF, Holmes AN, Schultz-Darken N, 
Williams LE, Brosnan SF. 2013. Different Responses to Reward Comparisons by 
Three Primate Species. PLoS ONE 8: e76297.  
Gallup GG. 1970. Chimpanzees: self-recognition. Science 167(3914):86-87. 
Hanus D, Call J. 2007. Discrete quantity judgments in the great apes (Pan paniscus, 
Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus): the effect of presenting whole 
sets versus item-by-item. Journal of Comparative Psychology 121(3):241. 
Higham JP and Maestripieri D. 2010. Revolutionary coalitions in male rhesus 
macaques. Behaviour 147:1889-1908. 
Hopper LM, Lambeth SP, Schapiro SJ, Bernacky BJ, Brosnan SF. 2013. The ontogeny 
of social comparisons in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Journal of 
Primatology 2:109. 
Hyatt CW. 1998. Responses of gibbons (Hylobates lar) to their mirror images. American 
Journal of Primatology 45(3): 307-311. 
Inoue‐Nakamura N. 1997. Mirror Self‐recognition in Nonhuman Primates: A 
Phylogenetic Approach. Japanese Psychological Research 39(3):266-275. 
Kitchen DM. 2004. Alpha male black howler monkey responses to loud calls: effect of 
numeric odds, male companion behaviour and reproductive investment. Animal 
Behaviour 67(1):125-139. 
Kogut T. 2012. Knowing what I should, doing what I want: From selfishness to inequity 
aversion in young children’s sharing behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology 
33(1):226-236.  
95 
 
 
Konrad AM and Pfeffer J. 1990. Do You Get What You Deserve? Factors Affecting the 
Relationship between Productivity and Pay. Administrative Science Quarterly 
35:258-286. 
Leung K. 1986. Effects of interactional goal on choice of allocation rule: A cross-
national study. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 37(1):111-
120.   
Loewenstein GF, Thompson L, Bazerman MH. 1989. Social Utility and Decision Making 
in Interpersonal Contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
57(3):426-441. 
Lord Jr RD. 1961. A population study of the gray fox. American Midland Naturalist 87-
109. 
Lutz C, Well A, Novak M. 2003. Stereotypic and self‐injurious behavior in rhesus 
macaques: a survey and retrospective analysis of environment and early 
experience. American Journal of Primatology 60(1):1-15. 
Maestripieri D, Schino G, Aureli F, Troisi A. 1992. A modest proposal: displacement 
activities as an indicator of emotions in primates. Animal Behaviour 44:967–979. 
Massen JJ, Van Den Berg LM, Spruijt BM, Sterck EH. 2012. Inequity aversion in 
relation to effort and relationship quality in long-tailed Macaques (Macaca 
fascicularis). American Journal of Primatology 74(2):145-156.  
Matsuzawa T. 2001. Primate Origins of Human Cognition and Behavior. Tokyo; New 
York: Springer.  
McAuliffe KJ, Blake PR, Kim G, Wrangham RW, Warneken F. 2013. Social influences 
on inequity aversion in children. PLoS ONE 8(12):1-11. 
96 
 
 
Mitani JC, Grether GF, Rodman PS, Priatna D. 1991. Associations among wild orang-
utans: sociality, passive aggregations or chance? Animal Behaviour 42(1):33-46. 
Mitani JC, Watts DP. 2001. Why do chimpanzees hunt and share meat? Animal 
Behaviour 61:915–924. 
Mitchell R. 2015. A critique of Stephane Savanah's 'mirror self-recognition and symbol-
mindedness’. Biology & Philosophy 30(1):137-144.  
Neiworth JJ, Johnson ET, Whillock K, Greenberg J, Brown V. 2009. Is a sense of 
inequity an ancestral primate trait? Testing social inequity in cotton top tamarins 
(Saguinus oedipus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 123(1):10. 
Nishida T. 1983. Alpha status and agonistic alliance in wild chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes schweinfurthii). Primates 24(3):318-336. 
Palombit RA. 1996. Pair bonds in monogamous apes: a comparison of the siamang 
Hylobates syndactylus and the white-handed gibbon Hylobates lar. 
Behaviour 133(5):321-356. 
Paulus M. 2015. Children’s inequity aversion depends on culture: a cross-cultural 
comparison. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 132:240-246. 
Perry S. 1996. Intergroup encounters in wild white-faced capuchins (Cebus 
capucinus). International Journal of Primatology 17(3):309-330.  
Perry S, Rose L. 1994. Begging and transfer of coati meat by white-faced capuchin 
monkeys, Cebus capuchinus. Primates 35:409–415. 
Pruitt DG, Carnevale PJD, Forcey B, Van Slyck M. 1986. Gender Effects in Negotiation: 
Constituent Surveillance and Contentious Behavior. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology 22: 264-275.  
97 
 
 
Range F, Horn L, Viranyi Z, Huber L. 2009. The absence of reward induces inequity 
aversion in dogs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106(1):340-
345. 
Ray JC, Sapolsky RM. 1992. Styles of male social behavior and their endocrine 
correlates among high-ranking wild baboons. Am J Primatol 28(4):231-50. 
Reichard U, Boesch C. 2003. Monogamy: Mating Strategies and Partnerships in Birds, 
Humans and Other Mammals. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Reichard U. 1995. Extra‐pair copulations in a monogamous gibbon (Hylobates 
lar). Ethology 100(2):99-112. 
Roma PG, Silberberg A, Ruggiero AM, Suomi SJ. 2006. Capuchin monkeys, inequity 
aversion, and the frustration effect. Journal of Comparative Psychology 
120(1):67-73.  
Rose LM. 1997. Vertebrate predation and food-sharing in Cebus and Pan. International 
Journal of Primatology 18:727–765. 
Rowell TE. 1966. Forest living baboons in Uganda . J Zool 149:344-65. 
Shaw A, Olson KR. 2012. Children discard a resource to avoid inequity. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 141(2):382. 
Sheskin M, Ashayeri K, Skerry A, Santos LR. 2014. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) 
fail to show inequality aversion in a no-cost situation. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 35(2):80-88. 
Silberberg A, Roma PG, Ruggiero AM, Suomi SJ. On inequity aversion in nonhuman 
primates. Journal of Comparative Psychology 120(1):76.  
98 
 
 
Silk J, Altmann J, Alberts S. 2006. Social relationships among adult female baboons 
(Papio cynocephalus) I. Variation in the strength of social bonds. Behav Ecol 
Sociobiol (2006) 61:183-195. 
Skitka LJ. 2012. Cross-Disciplinary Conversations: A Psychological Perspective on 
Justice Research with Non-human Animals. Social Justice Research 25(3):327-
335. 
Smith BR, Piel AK, Candland DK. 2003. Numerity of a socially housed hamadryas 
baboon (Papio hamadryas) and a socially housed squirrel monkey (Saimiri 
sciureus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 117(2):217. 
Smuts BB, Watanabe JM. 1990. Social relationships and ritualized greetings in adult 
male baboons (Papio cynocephalus anubis). International Journal of 
Primatology 11(2):147-172.  
Suárez SD, Gallup GG. 1981. Self-recognition in chimpanzees and orangutans, but not 
gorillas. Journal of Human Evolution 10(2):175-188. 
Suddendorf T, Collier-Baker E. 2009. The evolution of primate visual self-recognition: 
evidence of absence in lesser apes. Proceedings: Biological Sciences 
276(1662):1671-1677.  
Swartz KB, Evans S. 1991. Not all chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-
recognition. Primates 32(4):483-496. 
Talbot CF, Freeman HJ, Williams LE, Brosnan SF. 2011. Squirrel monkeys’ response 
to inequitable outcomes indicates a behavioral convergence within the primates. 
Biological Letters 7(5):680-682.  
99 
 
 
te Boekhorst IJA, Schürmann CL, Sugardjito J. 1990. Residential status and seasonal 
movements of wild orang-utans in the Gunung Leuser Reserve (Sumatera, 
Indonesia). Animal Behaviour 39(6):1098-1109. 
Ujhelyi M, Merker B, Buk P, Geissmann T. 2000. Observations on the behavior of 
gibbons (Hylobates leucogenys, H. gabriellae, and H. lar) in the presence of 
mirrors. Journal of Comparative Psychology 114(3):253-262. 
Van Leeuwen E, Zimmermann M, Davila R. 2011. Responding to inequities: gorillas try 
to maintain their competitive advantage during play fights. Biology Letters 
7(1):39-42. 
van Noordwijk MA, van Schaik CP 1987. Competition among adult female long-tailed 
macaques. Animal Behaviour 35:577–589. 
van Wolkenten M, Brosnan SF, de Waal FB. 2007. Inequity responses of monkeys 
modified by effort. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104:18854-
18859. 
van ‘t Wout M, Sanfey AG. 2011. Interactive decision-making in people with schizotypal 
traits: A game theory approach. Psychiatry Research 185(1-2):92-96. 
Watts DP. 1998. Coalitionary mate guarding by male chimpanzees at Ngogo, Kibale 
National Park, Uganda. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 44(1):43-55. 
Wilson ML, Hauser MD, Wrangham RW. 2001. Does participation in intergroup conflict 
depend on numerical assessment, range location, or rank for wild chimpanzees. 
Animal Behaviour 61(6):1203-1216. 
Yocum AM. 2010. Physical and Social Cognition in the White-handed Gibbon 
(Hylobates lar) (Dissertation). The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.  
100 
 
 
Yamagiwa J, Kahekwa J, Kanyunyi Basabose A. 2003. Intra-specific variation in social 
organization of gorillas: implications for their social evolution. Primates 44:359-
69. 
 
101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
Graduate School 
Southern Illinois University 
 
Jessica Feller      
 
jfeller@siu.edu 
 
Michigan State University 
Bachelor of Science, Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, May 2010 
Bachelor of Science, Zoology, July 2010 
 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale 
Master of Arts in Anthropology, May 2016 
 
 
Thesis Title: 
 The Evolution of Inequity Aversion: Nonhuman Primate Responses to Unequal 
Reward Distributions 
 
Major Professor:  Dr. Ulrich H. Reichard 
 
 
 
 
